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Introduction
Many would agree that health is the most precious good. Preserving health is a
demanding task not only for individuals but also for governments. This is reflected
in the important amount of resources allocated to health care, which are, in great
part, publically financed. In some countries health care expenditure is already above
10 % of the Gross National Product and this share is expected to continue growing
at least in the following years. Such trend can be explained by changes in income,
financing schemes, technology, demographics and life style.
Motivated to evaluate the impact of a change in a health care financing scheme
on demand, I devote the first chapter of this thesis to study how a more generous
public health care package can alter health care utilization services. This is a similar
question than the one addressed in the The Newhouse report of the RAND’s health
insurance experiment[29] but in a different context. I examine empirically the grad-
ual expansion of a new public health insurance program named Seguro Popular. The
program’s gradual expansion serves as an instrument to identify changes in health
care demand. The two main results are: First, there is, indeed, a significant change
in health care utilization due to insurance; second, individuals with worse health
tend to enroll in the public insurance first. The implications of these results may be
important as the Seguro Popular is expected to increase the share of the population
covered. Using those results, I could predict that the average cost of insuring people
could go down since sicker people are already insured but new-comers will change
their demand of services as they enroll in the program. This could be taken into
account to estimate the funds needed to undertake an increase in coverage.
As a health economist, I am interested in the optimal allocation of scarce
resources to maintain and improve the health status of the population. In the
second chapter, my colleague Pierre Stadelmann and I developed a theoretical model
to analyze the interaction between public and private health insurance providers.
We describe a situation where public health care is universally available for free and
private health insurance providers offer their service at market competitive prices.
We find some evidence that subsidizing the private providers is less costly than
treating the individuals that would have stayed in the public sector in the absence
1
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of the subsidy. The subsidy eliminates, or at least, reduces the dead-weight-loss
associated to a suboptimal treatment for the rich and increases the quality of the
services for the poor.
Efforts to preserve health are not only limited to health care expenditure.
Appropriate health behavior is an important factor contributing to positive health
outcomes. In the third chapter, I study the effect of education on health behavior.
Benefiting from an educational reform in Mexico that extended compulsory years
of education from 6 to 9 in 1993, I am able to analyze data on health behavior
from cohorts before and after the reform. I study sexual behavior and smoking
during adolescence. There is a significant preventive effect of education on having
an unprotected first sexual intercourse during adolescence. For smoking, I find that
increasing education for women beyond the 6th grade increases the probability of
beginning smoking during adolescence. This can be interpreted as an emancipation
sign of women with higher education yet this does not represent a favorable change
in health behavior. Nevertheless, we observe that women have an overall lower
propensity of starting smoking than men during adolescence even for educated peo-
ple.
Chapter 1
Demand for health care and public
insurance in Mexico
1.1 Introduction
The Seguro Popular Program (SPS) in Mexico was created in 2001 to protect indi-
viduals who were left out of the Social Security System (SSS) against catastrophic
health expenditures as well as to improve their access to health care services. Before
the implementation of the SPS program, nearly 50 percent of the population did not
have access to the SSS, either because they were independent workers or because
they worked in the informal sector. The SPS program offers a health care service
package to those families that do not have access to the SSS. The SPS enrollment
is voluntary in exchange of an enrollment fee that depends on the family’s income.
The difference in health care utilization between insured and uninsured has been
mainly explained in the literature by moral hazard and adverse selection. Adverse
selection in an insurance market is regarded as a source of inefficiency since it may
destroy the market for low risk individuals. In contrast, adverse selection for public
health insurance may not be that problematic given that the government’s objective
may prioritize insurance among higher risk individuals, even at a higher cost. This
is equivalent to redistributing resources from healthier to less healthy individuals.
Moral hazard in both public and private health insurance is considered to be a
source of inefficiency because the benefit of additional health care consumption does
not offset the additional cost. Exceptions are health externalities such as transmit-
table diseases or very poor individuals for which additional health consumption may
lead to a significant improvement in health status. The aim of this research is to
identify the source of the difference in utilization between insured and not insured
individuals in the SPS program. The identification is particularly interesting, given
3
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government’s objective to expand the SPS program. In 2005, the SPS covered about
14 percent of the population that was outside the SSS. One objective of the Mexican
government is to enlarge the program to cover a bigger share of the population that
does not have health insurance through employment. If the difference in health care
utilization between insured and uninsured is due to self-selection, then increasing
the share of the population covered by a public insurance does not change much
the utilization the pattern of new-comers. Consequently, the cost of insuring an
additional person is lower than the cost of those already insured. In contrast, if
moral hazard is significant, an expansion of the program makes that newly insured
individuals change their utilization pattern, thus increasing the total health expen-
diture. Identifying the source of the utilization difference has a major implication
to predict the demand for public health care services and the required investment
to provide them. This paper is organized as follows. In section two there is a brief
description of the Mexican Health Care System. Section three sets the basis for
the analysis between health care demand and health insurance. The model is ex-
plained in section four. Section five gives the details for the estimation and section
six summarizes the data set. Section seven develops a discussion of the result and I
conclude in section eight.
1.2 The Mexican Health Care System
The Mexican Health Care System counts with large public and private sectors. On
one hand, the public sector in Mexico is composed by Social Security Institutions
(SSI) and a network of Publically Sponsored Health Care Facilities (PSHCF). SSI
affiliation is mainly provided through employment and it comes along with other
employment benefits. The PSHCF can be accessed through two channels: either
through a subsidized fee for service or through affiliation to the Seguro Popular de
Salud (SPS). The SPS program requires an annual payment but no fee for service.
The private sector is mainly financed by out-of-pocket expenditure because the
private insurance market is poorly developed accounting for less than 3 per cent of
the total health expenditure. Private health care services are quite heterogeneous;
ranging from highly specialized hospitals to low skilled health care givers.
1.2.1 Social Security Institution (SSI)
The Social Security System is fragmented in several institutions which act as health
insurance and provide a wide array of health care services and drugs with no co-
payment. The Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) is the biggest SSI and
it is set up to provide health care services to workers in the private sector. It is
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financed by employer, employee and government quotas. The second largest SSI
is the State Workers Social Services and Security Institute (ISSSTE) and it offers
health care to public servants. The remaining SSIs, very small in the number of
affiliates, were created for specific employees such as those working in the Mexican
state-owned oil company and in the army. Each SSI has a network of hospitals which
provide health care services exclusively to their affiliates and quality of services varies
among institutions. The big share of the Mexican labor force working in the informal
sector represents a barrier to SSI to cover more families. Even though most of the
employers are requested by law to affiliates their workers in an SSI, only about half
of the Mexican population was able access health care through the SSI in 2001.
Those families that in 2001 had no affiliation to an SSI mostly had to finance health
care to out of pocket expenditure. Only about half of the Mexican population was
able access health care through an SSI in 2001. Even though most employers in
the private sector are requested by law to enroll their employees to the IMSS, the
big share of the informal sector in the Mexican labor market explains why so many
families are not affiliated to an SSI.
1.2.2 Seguro Popular de Salud (SPS)
The aim of the SPS program is to provide a form of health insurance to those who
are left out of the Social Security System. It was first implemented at the end of 2001
in six states and gradually expanded until January 2005, when it was implemented
in the entire country. Enrollment is voluntary and the fee is a function of the family
income. For the lowest two income deciles there is a zero enrollee fee, and from the
third decile onwards, the fees gradually increase up to a family fee equivalent to
1000 USD per year for the richest. Because most of the family income comes from
the informal economy for those affiliated to the SPS program, it is easy for them to
understate income in order to pay less The health care services in the SPS program
and in the private sector are mutually exclusive. SPS program does not refund
health care expenditures but it provides health care for free in its own network of
clinics and hospitals. Individuals with high willingness to pay for quality cannot top
up the services offered in the SPS program. The higher the quality in the private
sector that a family would get given its income with respect to the quality offered
in th SPS program, the more likely the family would renounce to the SPS health
care benefits even if the SPS services would be provided at no cost.
6 CHAPTER 1. DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE
1.3 Health insurance and health care demand
The interaction between health insurance and health care demand has been deeply
analyzed since the early remarks of Arrow(1963) [4] . Empirical research has focused
on testing the existence of self-selection and moral hazard. The RAND’s health
insurance experiment, as it is reported by Newhouse et al. (1993) [29], was a breaking
point in the study of health care demand and the impact of insurance on health.
The experiment pretended to shed light on two questions: how much more medical
care will people use if it is provided free of charge? and what are the consequences
for their health? One of the main finding was that cost sharing reduces the amount
of health care use of both necessary and unnecessary health care. Further, there is
no significant effect on health coming from cost sharing except for the sickest and
poorest patients. Cameron et al. (1988) [14] using a count data model for health
care utilization describe the interaction between health care demand and insurance
choice in Australia. Based on the 1977-78 Australian Health Insurance Survey, they
find a significant higher health care consumption in those who were insured with
a more generous coverage, but they do not provide a specific percentage for self
selection and moral hazard. They point out that the most important explanatory
variable in consumption is health status while income becomes the main determinant
when choosing an insurance plan. In a subsequent paper, Cameron and Trivedi
(1990) [13] combine the 1978-79 Australian Health Survey with the 1983 Australian
Health Insurance Survey and thus, encompass two different regimes. They analyze
the role of income and health risk in the choice of a health insurance. In the first
regime (1977-78) insurance is compulsory and the decision is whether or not to
buy a complementary insurance. In the second system (1983), insurance is not
compulsory, thus families must decide whether or not to buy insurance at all. This
latter case is closer to the Mexican scenario analyzed in this paper. They claim to
find evidence against great self-selection beyond gender and age. Regarding Mexican
health insurance studies, Zuniga (2008) [37] estimated the simultaneous decision of
whether to be self employed and whether to enroll to an SSI. This study benefits
from a panel structure of the Mexican Urban Employment Survey (ENEU) 1997-
98 and corrects for individual heterogeneity but at the same time is limited due
to the lack of health variables. She finds that the most significant factors that
explain SSI enrollment are marital status, firm size, age and gender. University
degree has an unexpected sign (negative), probably due to a correlation with other
variables. Sosa-Rubi et al. (2009) [18] focus on the utilization of obstetrical services
in Mexico using the Mexican Health and Nutrition Survey (MHNS 2006). They
simultaneously estimate the decisions to subscribe to SPS program and the usage of
the services provided by the SPS network. They find significant evidence that women
enrolled in the SPS program switched from using the private obstetrical services
to an SPS sponsored facility. Barros (2008)[6] combines data from MHNS (2006)
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and the Mexican Health Survey 2000 to evaluate the impact of the SPS program on
health and wealth of the insured population. According to Barros, the SPS program
effectively protected families from catastrophic health expenditures, but he cannot
find a significant improvement in health status. Probably this is because health care
has a delayed effect on health which is difficult to identify within a short time span.
1.4 The model
The eligible population for the SPS program faces a very similar decision problem
than a family who has to choose whether to buy a health insurance. Affiliates have
to pay an annual health care insurance package. A rational decision would con-
sider the expected value of being insured against its cost. The gains form insurance
have to take into account the benefits of a financial insurance and the expected
value of health care provision given a certain health status. Now, let us characterize
the decision to participate in the SPS program as a two stage utility maximiza-
tion problem for a typical individual with an income y. The decision is whether
or not to be enrolled in a health care network at a price P . Health care affiliation
gives the right to receive free health care in the network. Otherwise, health care
has to be acquired at price p per unit. The utility function has the following form
U(C,H(e, s|B), D(e, q)). C represents consumption, H health status and D the
disutility (side effects) of getting health care1. Health is a function of the amount
of health care treatment received e combined with the state of the nature s. B is
a vector of socio-economic characteristics. The disutility of health treatment D is
a transformation of the amount of health treatment and a provider’s quality index
named qi and qo to refer to the quality inside and outside the network, respectably.
The general intuition for modeling the H and D arguments is that patients appreci-
ate the positive impact of health care consumption on their health but at the same
time, they hate spending time in queues for a doctor visit.
Second stage
At this stage, the individual has already decided whether to affiliate to a network.
If the individual is insured, then he has to solve the following utility maximization
problem:
(1.1) max
e
U(y − P,H(e, s|B), D(e, qi))
1Intuitively D could be interpreted as the amount of leisure to sacrifice in order to get health
care treatment. The better the quality, the less leisure that has to be renounced per treatment.
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If the individual is not insured, then he faces the following constraint maximization
problem:
(1.2) max
c,e
U(c,H(e, s|B), D(e, qo)) st. y = c− pe
Let Vi(y − P, s, qi) and e∗i (s, qi) be the indirect utility function and the optimal
demand for health care for an individual enrolled in the program. Vo(y, p, s, qo) and
e∗o(s, qi) are the respective indirect utility function and the optimal demand for an
individual not participating in the SPS program.
First stage
The individual maximizes his expected utility in order to decide whether to subscribe
to a health care network. The state of the nature s is unknown at the time of taking
the decision but the conditional distribution of the state of the nature is known:
EVo =
∫
Vo(y, s, p, qo)pi(s | B)ds
EVi =
∫
Vi(y − P, s, p, qi)pi(s | B)ds(1.3)
wo and w1 are the error terms of the expected utility for being unaffiliated and
affiliated to a health care network respectively. Then, the probability of being
affiliated to a health care network is:
Pr(affiliation = 1) = Pr(EV1 + w1 > EVo + wo)
= Pr(wo − w1 < EV1 − EVo)(1.4)
1.5 Econometric specification
The system is described by thee equations, two of them are related to health care uti-
lization and the other to the insurance decision. The three dichotomous endogenous
variables are Ambulatory, Hospital and SPS which are defined as:
Ambulatoryi =
{
1 if i has used ambulatory services during the past two weeks
0 otherwise.
Hospitali =
{
1 if i has been hospitalized during the last year
0 otherwise.
SPSi =
{
1 if i is enrolled to the SPS program
0 otherwise.
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The latent variables are denoted with a star. Xi represents a vector socio-economic
and health variables that are common in the three equations. Z1,i,Z2,i and Z3,i are
three vectors variables specific to each equation. The entire system can be described
as follows:
Ambualtory∗i = α1,3SPSi + b1Xi + c1Z1,i + u1,i
Hospital∗i = b2Xi + c2Z2,i + u2,i
SPS∗i = γ3,2Hospital
∗
i + b3Xi + c3Z3,i + u3,i
Regarding to the estimation of the system, as it is broadly described by Huguening
(2004) [23], it is possible to have both latent and dichotomous version of the en-
dogenous variables as explanatory variables. As the risk of hospitalization is what
influences the decision to buy insurance, I use the probability of being hospitalized
as explanatory variable for the insurance equation. In contrast, to measure the ef-
fect of being insured on the use of ambulatory services I take into account whether
an individual is insured, valued 0 or 1. It is the fact, and not the probability, of
being insured which makes one more like to visit the doctor. In order to represent
the system in a matrix form I name ambulatory use y1,i , hospitalization y2,i and
enrollment in the SPS program y3,i
A∗Y∗i = AYi +BXi + CZi + Ui
A∗ and A define the structure of unobserved endogenous latent variables and the
observable dichotomous counterparts respectively.
A∗ =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 γ3,2 1
A =
 0 0 α1,30 0 0
0 0 0

In order to be able to comply with the logical consistency condition as suggested
by Gourieroux et al. (1980)[20], I need the resulting reduced form matrix from
endogenous variables to be an upper triangular matrix with zeros in the diagonal.
Therefore, it is necessary to do some restrictions. For instance, I cannot include
ambulatory use as an explanatory variable for the enrollment equation and at the
same time enrolment to the SPS program as an explanatory equation for the ambu-
latory use equation. The proposed model that complies with the logical consistency
condition is the following. The first equation takes into account that the propensity
for ambulatory use is affected by the fact of being insured. In the second equation, I
assume that the propensity of being hospitalized is not affected by insurance status.
This restriction may be subject to discussion but it is in line with most part of the
empirical studies showing that there is no significant moral hazard effect on hospi-
talization. In addition to that, induced demand due to insurance it is not likely to
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occur because in the SPS program physicians are paid a fixed monthly salary. If
there is no induced demand and no moral hazard in hospitalization, there should not
be any problem with this restriction. In the third equation, I make the assumption
that the propensity of being insured is going to be influenced by the propensity of
being hospitalized but not by the propensity of using ambulatory services. The rea-
son for this assumption is that hospitalization is the mayor source for catastrophic
health care expenditure. Therefore the risk of hospitalization should be a more de-
terminant factor to seek for health care insurance. Now, by computing the reduced
form of both matrices, we get:
A∗−1A =
 0 0 α1,30 0 0
0 0 0

Since the resulting matrix has a triangular form with zeros in the diagonal, then it
satisfies the condition of logical consistency. The estimation of the system was done
using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK), the smooth recursive simulator to
approximate the integrals of the likelihood function as proposed by Terracol (2002)
[34].
1.6 Mexican Health and Nutrition Survey 2006
The 2006 Mexican Health and Nutrition Survey (MHNS) is a cross sectional data set
comprehending 206,700 individuals in 48,304 households. It contains information on
health status, health insurance and socio-economic variables. Each household hav-
ing at least one person aged 20 years or more filled in a special questioner on health
status, health care utilization and health behavior. The sample analyzed compre-
hends adults aged 50 years old and older, who were eligible to participate in the
SPS program. Considering this group of individuals presents two advantages. First,
in this subsample individuals did not have the choice of being insured in an SSI at
the time the SPS program was created. Younger individuals may have the choice
whether to take an employment offering SSI benefits. Affiliation to an SSI institu-
tion usually happens during the first working life years since it is offered as a part
of the employment benefits. If a person is offered an affiliation to an SSI, then it
is likely that he or she remains affiliated throughout his or her entire career. Sec-
ondly, at 50, all women have finished their reproductive life, making it easier to
model their health care demand. On the other side I recognize that 50 year old
and older adults have higher utilization rates than the general population. So the
estimation would be valid only for this group but nevertheless we would have shed
some light on individual response to social health insurance. The total sub-sample
encompasses 6,306 individuals who were eligible aged 50 or older and who completed
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Table 1.1: Explanatory variables means, conditional on health insurance status
Adults years old and older
Variable SSI SPS None Total
n=5308 n=1461 n=4845 n=11614
Female 0.556 0.553 0.521 0.541
Age 63.579 62.729 62.653 63.086
Indigenous 0.043 0.106 0.111 0.079
Adults 3 0.446 0.352 0.405 0.417
Minors 3 0.035 0.112 0.083 0.065
Marital status
Single/divorced∗ 0.180 0.244 0.263 0.223
Married 0.609 0.558 0.524 0.567
Widowed 0.211 0.198 0.213 0.210
Education
No education∗ 0.177 0.434 0.372 0.291
Some education 0.288 0.399 0.340 0.324
Primary 0.264 0.127 0.184 0.213
Secondary 0.135 0.033 0.059 0.090
High school & + 0.136 0.007 0.045 0.082
Income
Low∗ 0.119 0.727 0.536 0.370
Medium 0.214 0.132 0.160 0.181
High 0.248 0.049 0.117 0.168
House type 0.419 0.092 0.187 0.281
Health
Good health 0.513 0.429 0.484 0.490
Good weight 0.476 0.549 0.559 0.520
Chronic illness 0.194 0.194 0.139 0.171
Disability 0.099 0.094 0.082 0.091
Sport 0.236 0.316 0.313 0.278
Smoked 0.318 0.284 0.283 0.299
Alcohol drinker 0.065 0.053 0.076 0.068
Residence
Rural∗ 0.118 0.496 0.356 0.265
Sub urban 0.269 0.343 0.314 0.297
Urban 0.613 0.161 0.330 0.438
North 0.140 0.127 0.090 0.118
North Pacific 0.264 0.246 0.172 0.223
Center north 0.192 0.230 0.204 0.202
Center Gulf 0.079 0.128 0.145 0.113
Center South 0.114 0.062 0.106 0.104
South East 0.112 0.172 0.104 0.116
South∗ 0.099 0.035 0.179 0.124
* Single/divorced, No education, Low income, Rural and South region are the group benchmark categorical variables and for this
reason those variables do not appear on the regression tables.
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both questioners. The variables conditional sample means on health insurance for
explanatory variables are shown in Table 1.1. It also includes information on 5,308
SSI enrolled individuals in a separate column, just for comparative purposes. The
list of explanatory variables can be classified in three main groups: socio-economic,
health and residence. All variables are dichotomous except age. Adults 3 and minors
3, which refer to whether there are three or more adults (older than 19 years old)
or minors in the household. Information about marital status, income and place of
residence are captured by a group of dichotomous variables. The reference classes for
each group (excluded variables) are divorced-single for marital status, low income
for income class, rural for type of residence and South region for geographical region.
House type controls for wealth and takes the value of one if the individual lives in a
house with a fixed telephone line, refrigerator and stove. Good Health is valued one
if the individual considers being in good or very good health. Sport equals one if
the interviewee regularly does moderate physical activity for more than 30 min two
times per week. Smoke is valued one if the individual ever smoked more than 20
cigarettes in his/her life. SSI concentrates a larger share of urban, relatively highly
educated and high income individuals. In contrast, SPS has a higher proportion of
individual living in rural areas (neither suburban nor urban), with low education
and low income. The uninsured population has the lowest concentration of individ-
uals with chronic illnesses and disability while it presents a higher concentration of
individuals who declare being in good weight. The system of equations is identified
by a group of instruments. Health problem is a variable only included in the first
equation. This variable has a value of one if the surveyed individual experienced
a health problem during the precedent 15 days. In order to break the correlation
between ambulatory use and SPS enrollment, I first take the predicted probability
of having a health problem given the health status by a probit model and then use
the unexplained health shock as an instrument. The variables controlling for the
number of doctors per 1000 inhabitants in each municipality are only used in the
second equation. These are administrative data published by the National Insti-
tute of Statistics Geography and Informatics (INEGI) corresponding to 2005. By
identifying the municipalities, it is possible to merge both data sets.
The group of variables that explain enrollment in the SPS program but that
are independent of ambulatory use and hospitalization are dummy variables that
control for the time when the program became available in each state. In 2001,
the SPS program was only implemented in six states. The incorporation of the
remaining states occurred gradually until 2005 when the program became available
nationwide.
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Table 1.2: Instrumental variables means, conditional on endogenous variable value
Yes No Total
Instrument Ambulatory
n=756 n=5550 n=6306
H. problem 0.6428571 0.0998198 0.1649223
Hospital
n=264 n=6042 n=6306
Dr. SSI 1.900173 1.653293 1.663629
Dr. SSA-SPS 0.7624077 0.6662425 0.6702684
Dr. private 0.4713257 0.4448759 0.4459832
SPS insurance
n=1461 n=4845 n=6306
SPS 2002 0.2320329 0.1023736 0.1324136
SPS 2005 0.1341547 0.1973168 0.1826832
SPS eligible population only
1.7 Results and discussion
The estimated parameters are shown in tables 1.3 to 1.6. Tables 1.3 to 1.5 cor-
respond to the estimation of ambulatory use, hospitalization and SPS enrollment,
respectively. In these tables, the first column presents the results of the Probit esti-
mation. The second column shows the corresponding marginal effects and column 3
presents the estimated parameters of the simultaneous system. Table 1.6 shows the
likelihood ratio and the pseudo R2 for the equation by equation estimation. In the
lower right hand side, the estimated variance covariance parameters are shown. The
standard errors are presented in squared brackets at three, two and one star mean
one, five and ten percent significance level. In both estimation methods we get the
same sign for the coefficients but the magnitude and the significance levels differ.
The estimated correlation between the equations’ errors is statistically significant
especially for equation one.
1.7.1 Ambulatory use
The impact of insurance on ambulatory use is positive and significant even after con-
trolling for simultaneity, with a predicted marginal effect of 3.5 percentage points.
Socioeconomic characteristics, except gender, have low explanatory power for ambu-
latory use. Women are significantly more intense users of ambulatory services with
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Table 1.3: Estimation for ambulatory use equation, n=6306
Probit Mfx Probit T. Probit
SPS 0.23[0.056]*** 0.0352[0.0093]*** 0.315[0.074]***
H problem 1.465[0.051]*** 0.205[0.009]*** 1.442[0.051]***
Female 0.169[0.058]*** 0.0235[0.008]*** 0.169[0.058]***
Age 0.022[0.026] 0.003[0.0036] 0.018[0.026]
Age2 -0.129[0.191] -0.0181[0.03] -0.106[0.191]
Indigenous -0.126[0.09] -0.0164[0.0108] -0.117[0.09]
Adults 3 -0.062[0.054] -0.0086[0.0074] -0.059[0.054]
Minors 3 -0.116[0.093] -0.0152[0.0113] -0.116[0.092]
Marital status
Married 0.047[0.06] 0.0065[0.0084] 0.048[0.06]
Widowed 0.151[0.073]** 0.0226[0.0116]* 0.159[0.073]**
Education
Some education -0.108[0.057]* -0.0147[0.0076]* -0.101[0.057]*
Primary -0.034[0.077] -0.0047[0.0104] -0.023[0.077]
Secondary -0.084[0.123] -0.0111[0.0155] -0.079[0.124]
High school & + -0.253[0.168] -0.0299[0.0163]* -0.229[0.167]
Income
Medium 0.085[0.072] 0.0124[0.011] 0.084[0.072]
High -0.104[0.102] -0.0137[0.0126] -0.095[0.101]
House type 0.087[0.072] 0.0127[0.011] 0.088[0.072]
Health
Good health -0.301[0.051]*** -0.0418[0.007]*** -0.299[0.051]***
Good weight -0.144[0.049]*** -0.0204[0.0071]*** -0.141[0.049]***
Chronic illness 0.54[0.059]*** 0.0983[0.0132]*** 0.532[0.059]***
Disability 0.205[0.08]** 0.0324[0.0141]** 0.205[0.08]**
Sport -0.109[0.057]* -0.0148[0.0075]** -0.111[0.057]*
Smoked 0.071[0.06] 0.0102[0.0088] 0.066[0.06]
Alcohol drinker -0.399[0.128]*** -0.0434[0.0104]*** -0.412[0.133]***
Residence
Sub urban -0.086[0.058] -0.0117[0.0078] -0.088[0.058]
Urban -0.125[0.067]* -0.0169[0.0088]* -0.115[0.067]*
North 0.087[0.104] 0.0128[0.016] 0.061[0.105]
North Pacific 0.166[0.09]* 0.0251[0.0146]* 0.142[0.091]
Center North 0.063[0.088] 0.0091[0.013] 0.045[0.088]
Center Gulf 0.218[0.092]** 0.0342[0.016]** 0.203[0.092]**
Center South 0.147[0.107] 0.0224[0.0177] 0.133[0.107]
South East 0.069[0.106] 0.0101[0.0159] 0.033[0.108]
Constant -2.264[0.874]** .- -2.169[0.874]**
1. Age2 coefficient and standard error are multiplied by 1000
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an estimated 2.3 percentage points more probability to attend ambulatory services.
Age takes a concave form but neither of the variables is statistically significant.
Widowed have a higher probability of reporting usage of ambulatory services at 5
percent significance level. Education and income do not show any effect. This may
be the result of some effects that are canceled out. Regarding education, on one
hand, better educated people have a greater ability to avoid unnecessary doctor vis-
its. On the other, education may make individuals aware of the health risk related
to untreated illnesses. An explanation of the no effect of income on ambulatory use
could be that high income households use more ambulatory services than low income
households but they access higher quality services. In addition, for families enrolled
in the SPS program there is no co-payment for ambulatory services, making income
less relevant to explain utilization. Health variables are, most of them, significant
and with the expected sign. Good weight, Good health and Sport variables reduce
significantly the probability of visiting a doctor (during the precedent15 days). The
instrumental variable health problem is highly significant and any criteria for a weak
instrument test (χ = 825). smokes has a positive coefficient but it is not statisti-
cally significant which may be due to the fact that the variable does not capture if
individuals are currently smoking or how intense smokers they are. Alcohol drinker
has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, showing that alcohol drinkers
are more reluctant to use ambulatory services. Geographic variables do not seem
to have a major explanatory power in the utilization of ambulatory health services.
Only North Pacific and Center Gulf regions have significant higher use at 10 and
5 percent significant level respectively. Urban individuals are less intense users of
ambulatory services at a 10 percent significance level.
1.7.2 Hospitalization
Hospitalization equation shows a very similar pattern than its ambulatory use coun-
terpart. Socioeconomic variables are not significant, not even for gender or marital
status. In contrast, health variables are highly significant except for Good weight
and smoke that have the correct sign but do not appear to be significant neither in
the equation by equation nor in the simultaneous estimation. Good health, chronic
illness, disability, sport and alcohol drinker variables show the same sign than the
previous estimated equation. Geographical location and the municipality’s size do
not describe in a significant fashion the propensity of having been hospitalized in
the last year. Nonetheless, the variables controlling for concentration of doctors
working in hospitalization in the municipality are significant and with the correct
sign, which is important to identify the system.
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Table 1.4: Estimation for hospitalization equation. n=6306
Probit Mfx Probit T. Probit
Dr. SSI 0.046[0.02]** 0.0032[0.0014]** 0.048[0.02]**
Dr. SSA 0.087[0.052]* 0.006[0.0036]* 0.087[0.051]*
Dr. Private 0.336[0.166]** 0.0234[0.0115]** 0.326[0.166]**
Female 0.039[0.07] 0.0027[0.0049] 0.044[0.069]
Age 0.029[0.031] 0.002[0.0022] 0.031[0.031]
Age2 -0.182[0.226] -0.0126[0.02] -0.193[0.226]
Indigenous -0.129[0.116] -0.0082[0.0067] -0.117[0.112]
Adults 3 -0.104[0.067] -0.0071[0.0045] -0.071[0.068]
Minors 3 0.145[0.108] 0.0112[0.0093] 0.139[0.108]
Marital status
Married 0.07[0.076] 0.0048[0.0053] 0.072[0.076]
Widowed 0.001[0.093] 0.0001[0.0065] -0.019[0.094]
Education
Some education -0.049[0.071] -0.0033[0.0048] -0.052[0.07]
Primary -0.113[0.099] -0.0073[0.006] -0.1[0.097]
Secondary -0.14[0.158] -0.0086[0.0086] -0.144[0.157]
High school & + -0.004[0.182] -0.0003[0.0126] -0.008[0.185]
Income
Medium -0.018[0.092] -0.0013[0.0062] -0.042[0.096]
High -0.137[0.122] -0.0086[0.0069] -0.166[0.126]
House type 0.061[0.088] 0.0044[0.0066] 0.07[0.088]
Health
Good health -0.317[0.066]*** -0.0219[0.0045]*** -0.305[0.066]***
Good weight -0.025[0.062] -0.0018[0.0044] -0.03[0.062]
Chronic illness 0.416[0.07]*** 0.0381[0.0081]*** 0.424[0.07]***
Disability 0.47[0.085]*** 0.047[0.0115]*** 0.457[0.085]***
Sport -0.167[0.075]** -0.011[0.0046]** -0.172[0.074]**
Smoked 0.098[0.073] 0.0071[0.0055] 0.092[0.073]
Alcohol drinker -0.378[0.171]** -0.0195[0.0062]*** -0.371[0.171]**
Residence
Sub urban 0.034[0.075] 0.0024[0.0053] 0.034[0.073]
Urban 0.109[0.086] 0.0079[0.0065] 0.091[0.086]
North 0.086[0.134] 0.0064[0.0106] 0.1[0.134]
North Pacific 0.094[0.117] 0.007[0.0091] 0.113[0.118]
Center North 0.129[0.115] 0.0097[0.0092] 0.142[0.116]
Center Gulf 0.277[0.122]** 0.0233[0.0121]* 0.281[0.123]**
Center South -0.057[0.145] -0.0038[0.0092] -0.052[0.147]
South East 0.265[0.132]** 0.0223[0.0132]* 0.296[0.132]**
Cons -3.265[1.057]*** 0 -3.379[1.058]***
1. Age2 coefficient and standard error are multiplied by 1000
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Table 1.5: Estimation for SPS enrollment equation. N=6306
Probit Mfx Probit T. Probit
Hospital 0.308[0.088]*** 0.0947[0.0296]*** 0.368[0.104]***
SPS 2002 0.446[0.058]*** 0.1392[0.02]*** 0.444[0.058]***
SPS 2005 -0.059[0.054] -0.0161[0.0145] -0.061[0.054]
Female 0.124[0.045]*** 0.0342[0.0122]*** 0.123[0.044]***
Age 0.025[0.021] 0.0069[0.0058] 0.026[0.021]
Age2 -0.222[0.155] -0.0614[0.04] -0.23[0.155]
Indigenous -0.097[0.064] -0.0259[0.0166] -0.099[0.064]
Adults 3 -0.104[0.041]** -0.0284[0.0111]** -0.108[0.041]***
Minors 3 0.208[0.063]*** 0.0616[0.0199]*** 0.203[0.063]***
Marital status
Married 0.125[0.046]*** 0.0343[0.0127]*** 0.122[0.046]***
Widowed -0.048[0.059] -0.013[0.0159] -0.045[0.059]
Education
Some education -0.03[0.043] -0.0084[0.0118] -0.031[0.043]
Primary -0.229[0.061]*** -0.059[0.0146]*** -0.23[0.061]***
Secondary -0.295[0.1]*** -0.072[0.0213]*** -0.297[0.1]***
High school & + -0.664[0.167]*** -0.1352[0.0224]*** -0.65[0.165]***
Income
Medium -0.139[0.057]** -0.0367[0.0144]** -0.134[0.057]**
High -0.326[0.08]*** -0.0799[0.0171]*** -0.324[0.08]***
House type -0.267[0.062]*** -0.0681[0.0145]*** -0.268[0.062]***
Health
Good health -0.046[0.038] -0.0128[0.0106] -0.048[0.038]
Good weight -0.05[0.039] -0.0137[0.0107] -0.048[0.039]
Chronic illness 0.192[0.051]*** 0.056[0.0158]*** 0.185[0.051]***
Disability -0.007[0.069] -0.0019[0.019] -0.007[0.069]
Sport 0.013[0.043] 0.0035[0.0118] 0.013[0.043]
Smoked 0.095[0.046]** 0.0268[0.0131]** 0.098[0.046]**
Alcohol drinker -0.163[0.081]** -0.0423[0.0197]** -0.162[0.081]**
Residence
Sub urban -0.078[0.044]* -0.0212[0.0117]* -0.077[0.043]*
Urban -0.497[0.053]*** -0.1247[0.0121]*** -0.49[0.053]***
North 1.182[0.091]*** 0.4172[0.0335]*** 1.172[0.09]***
North Pacific 1.095[0.085]*** 0.3687[0.0303]*** 1.084[0.084]***
Center North 0.915[0.082]*** 0.2994[0.0287]*** 0.906[0.081]***
Center Gulf 0.863[0.086]*** 0.2899[0.0317]*** 0.854[0.085]***
Center South 0.841[0.098]*** 0.2872[0.037]*** 0.83[0.097]***
South East 1.124[0.09]*** 0.3917[0.0334]*** 1.113[0.089]***
Cons -2.178[0.698]*** .- -2.181[0.699]***
1. Age2 coefficient and standard error are multiplied by 1000
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1.7.3 SPS enrollment
Contrary to the utilization equations, most of socioeconomic, municipality’s size and
geographical variables are highly significant to determine the probability to partic-
ipate in the SPS program. Female, married, and household with 3 or more minor
variables have a positive impact on the propensity of being affiliated and are stati-
cally significant at 1 per cent level. Both higher education and higher income reduce
this propensity. This result is not surprising since the enrollee fee is a function of
income but at the same time, richer families would be able to get higher quality
services in the private sector (rather than those offered in the SPS program). Ed-
ucation is highly correlated with long term income so it may be a reason why it
shows a similar pattern. Health variables have the expected sign but few of them
are statistically significant. Chronic illness and smoke have a positive influence on
the propensity of being insured at 1 and 5 percent significance level. Good health and
Good weight have a negative coefficient which is expected under the self-selection
hypothesis, nevertheless it is not significant. Alcohol drinker has a lower probabil-
ity of being insured showing his lower valuation for acquiring health care services.
The endogenous variable Hospitalization is highly significant with an estimated 9.5
percentage points higher probability of being insured in the equation by equation
estimation and the coefficient is a bit higher for the simultaneous equation estima-
tion. This result can be interpreted that, at least partially, the difference in health
care utilization is due to self- selection. Affiliation to the SPS significantly lowers
in urban and sub urban households. Affiliation to SPS program seems to be very
sensitive to regions. North and South East regions have an estimated 41 and 39
percentage point higher probability of being affiliated than the South region. The
instrumental variables have the correct sign. Individuals living in the states that
first implemented the SPS program had a higher probability of being affiliated to
the program and highly significant. SPS 2005 coefficient predicts a lower probabil-
ity of being affiliated for the individuals living in states that last implemented the
SPS program but it is not statistically significant. A joint test for the significance
instruments of this equation at the first stage regression shows the null hypothesis
of week instrument is rejected χ = 13.91.
1.7.4 The variance covariance matrix
The null hypothesis that the errors between the three equations are independent is
rejected at 1 percent. The higher correlation is among the two health care utilization
equations with ρ1,2 = 0.184 which is as expected. Therefore there is a substantial
gain in efficiency when estimating both equations jointly. The correlation between
equation 2 and 3, hospitalization and SPS enrollment is not significantly different
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Table 1.6: Quality of adjustment and the Variance Covariance matrix
Equation 1 Model
LR χ2 1231.33 Wald χ2(99) 194.13
Prob > χ2(32) 0.0000 Prob > χ2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.2662
Variance covariance matix
Equation 2
LR χ2 200 ρ1,2 0.184[0.044]***
Prob > χ2(33) 0.0000 ρ1,3 -0.058[0.03]**
Pseudo R2 0.0912 ρ2,3 -0.028[0.028]
Equation 3 Ho : ρ1,2 = ρ1,3 = ρ2,3 = 0
LR χ2 810.64 χ2(3) 18.66
Prob > χ2(33) 0.0000 Prob > χ2 0.0003
Pseudo R2 0.1187
form zero at any reasonable confidence level. Finally, a correlation between equation
1 and 3, ambulatory use and SPS enrollment is less than 0.06 but still significant at
5 percent. A Hausman test cannot be performed because the data fails to meet the
asymptotic assumption for the test. Alternatively, I use a Walt test for erogeneity
which with a χ(31) value of 15.51 rejects at one percent significance level the hy-
pothesis of no systematic difference in the coefficient estimated from the Probit and
trivariate Probit equations.
1.7.5 Limitations
The estimation of the system with ambulatory, hospital and SPS endogenous vari-
ables shows evidence that the difference in health care use between insured and
uninsured individuals comes from both sources. On one hand, the propensity of
being insured increases in anticipation of being hospitalized, which corresponds to
the adverse selection argument. On the other hand, we observe that the probability
of having visited a physician increases with the fact of being enrolled to the SPS
program. Although those results are highly significant they may be sensitive to
three factors that I want to acknowledge. First, the exclusion restrictions that were
imposed in order to estimate the system limited the model to capture moral haz-
ard on hospitalization. The restrictions are in line with the conclusion on previous
studies that find moral hazard in ambulatory use and drugs consumption but not in
hospitalization. Second, SSI competing alternative was not considered. The reason
was the sample considered, older adults, who did not had the choice whether or not
to enroll to an SSI. Usually, the decision to find a job which offers enrollment in
a SSI comes during the first working life years. At the time the individuals of the
sample accepted their first job the SPS program did not exist. Third, this study is
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based on a cross-sectional data set which does not allow controlling for individual
specific effects. An interesting study would have been to measure the health care
behavior for individuals before and after enrollment to the SPS program. Fourth,
extrapolation of those results to other segments of the population may be invalid.
Although individuals face similar incentives under SPS enrollment, there are specific
characteristic of the considered group in terms of the opportunity cost of a doctor
visit, overall health status and life time planning horizon. Two possible extensions
could be recommended for this article. One would be to include quality differences
between networks of health care providers. The main challenge would be to find
variables that can measure quality in the SPS network and the equivalent in the
private sector given certain family income. The second would be to explore if there
is a systematic bias on health status since some individuals could be unaware of
certain illness that could be correlated with insurance. If this was the case, unin-
sured individuals could appear to be healthier than they really are, so the impact
of insurance on health care demand could be underestimated.
1.8 Conclusions
The analysis of the impact of the SPS program on health care demand benefits from
data collected during the first years of the program’s implementation. This was
crucial in order to model enrollment to the program independently of being affiliated
to a SSI institution. In addition, the fact that the program was implemented in
different periods in time throughout the country provides a good instrument to
identify health care use equations. Based on the simultaneous equation estimation
I find evidence supporting an increase in ambulatory services utilization due to SPS
program. At the same time, the program has attracted individuals with a higher
probability of being hospitalized. In order to evaluate the benefits of additional
health care consumption, it is important to measure its impact on health. For
several reasons measuring the impact of insurance on health is very difficult to
identify. The effects on health might not be instantaneous, it may be endogenous
to health care demand and health insurance and they are sensitive to selection bias.
The higher propensity to participate in insurance due to higher risk of requiring
hospitalization means that the program would have protected the most vulnerable
families from catastrophic health care expenditures, which was one of the program’s
objectives. One of the major policy implications of this study is related with budget
planning for expansion of social health insurance programs. As the SPS program
expands to cover a bigger share of the Mexican population, I would expect that
the new-comers would be in a better health condition than the individuals already
insured. This would require an investment which was lower than proportional to
the number of newly insured. Nevertheless, the health care demand of the newly
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insured individuals would rise as a consequence of the program.
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1.9 Appendix
Variable Valued 1 if ... zero otherwise
Female female.
Indigenous consider his/her self as indigenous and speak an indigenous language.
Adults 3 lives in a household with 3 or more persons age 20 or older included himself.
Minors 3 lives in a household with 3 or more persons younger than 20 years old.
Marital status
Married married.
Widowed widowed.
Education
Some education has completed one year of formal education but did not finish primary school .
Primary has completed primary school but no secondary school or further.
Secondary has completed secondary school or equivalent but not further.
High school & + has completed high school or equivalent and further.
Income
Medium household income is superior to the poorest 1/3 but inferior to the richest 1/3.
High household income is superior to the poorest 2/3.
House type house with refrigerator, stove or microwave, and fixed telephone line.
Health
Good health declare him/her self as being in good health, five categories.
Good weight declare him/her self as being in good weight, five categories.
Chronic illness declare to have a chronic illness.
Disability declare to have a disability.
Sport declare to do moderate physical activity for more than 30 min two times per week.
smoked has ever smoked more than 20 cigarettes in his/her life.
Alcohol drinker has drunk more than 5dl of wine or equivalent in one occasion
at least twice during the last month.
Residence
Sub urban locality from 2500 to 99,999 habitants.
Urban locality 100,000 habitants and more.
North Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas.
North Pacific Baja California, Baja California Sur, Sonora, Sinaloa, Nayarit, Jalisco and Colima.
Center North Duarango, Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, San Luis Potos´ı, Guanajuato and Queretaro.
Center Gulf Veracruz, Hidalgo, Tlaxaca and Puebla.
Center South Mexico, Federal District and Morelos.
South East Yucatan, Quintana Roo, Campeche and Tabasco.
Chapter 2
Optimal subsidy for private health
insurance providers
Joint work with Pierre Stadelmann
2.1 Introduction
Most governments allocate a substantial amount of resources to provide private
goods or services. In cases where public and private provision are mutually exclu-
sive, individuals have to decide whether to get the freely provided public good or
buy it in the private market. Health insurance is a particular industry where we
observe this interaction between private and public providers. For instance in Spain,
every inhabitant has the right to get health care treatment from public facilities,
nevertheless many individuals opt out to by private insurance for private health care.
The government saves money as people buy private insurance and are not using the
public provision. Tax rebates to buy private insurance have been put in place to
encourage individuals to opt out.
In this paper, we discuss the advantages of giving incentives for opting out of
the public sector. In our setting, health insurance is publicly and privately available.
Public sector provides health care for free to any individual. Poor people have to
rely on public provision, due to liquidity constraints. Under those circumstances the
public provision of a private good is necessary to secure a minimum level of health
care to the whole population.
Richer individuals might be interested in opting out for (costly) private health
insurance. Given that there will be a price to pay to access the private market,
quality in the private sector needs to be higher to justify this increase in price.
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The public budget for health care is fixed. Therefore, the resources available
per patient shrink as more people are treated publicly. The government wants to
provide the highest possible quality for the poor (universal provision of health care),
but it cannot forbid the rich to seek public treatment. However, it can incentivize
them to opt out. This increases the resources available for the poor.
How should the government allocate its fixed budget between the two alter-
natives? It can subsidize the private sector or it can provide health care. We will
examine the optimal level of subsidy under perfect and asymmetric information.
Under asymmetric information we analyze two possible scenarios. The first one is
where private firms cannot distinguish between health risks nor can offer different
contracts to induce individuals to self select. Solidarity policy refers to this case,
where a normative rule makes everyone pay the same amount of money for a health
insurance plan regardless of health status. The second scenario refers to separating
contracts, where although firms cannot distinguish between healthy and sick indi-
viduals, they can offer different contracts to push individuals to revel their health
status.
This paper examines the relationship between public and private providers
of health care. This analysis could also be made on education or other publicly
provided private goods.
Next section deals with literature review. In section 3, we present the model
and its assumptions. We then examine different scenarios, with different information
structure. Section 5 presents some examples, before we conclude.
2.2 Literature review
This paper builds on three different strands of literature. The first one is the litera-
ture concerning the public provision of private good. Besley and Coate (1991)[8] set
up a model where the public sector supplies a discrete private good, such as health
or education. Universal provision does not mean that private provision does not
exist. Depending on quality, some agents will still benefit from buying the good at
a higher quality from the private sector. This permits redistribution from the rich
to the poor, but is associated with some dead weight losses. Direct income redistri-
bution via taxes is more efficient, but assumes that income is perfectly observable.
Redistribution via universal public provision of a private good is possible even un-
der some form of information asymmetry. Blo¨mquist and Christiansen (1998) [10]
examine whether subsidizing the private sector is preferable to public providing.
Both instruments lead to some distortion. In their model, the optimal allocation
between subsidy and public provision depends on the differences in consumption
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between the high skill (who over consume) and low skill workers. Blo¨mquist et al.
(2010) [9] extend this analysis to cases where the quantity of good publicly provided
can be individualized. This can be the case for instance in health care, when it is
provided according to needs (the authors provide other examples). They showed
that in these cases the taxation can be non-distortive. Hoel and Saether (2003)[22]
introduce waiting time in the public provision of health care. Patients with high
waiting time costs opt out for private treatment, therefore reducing the costs of
the public provision of care. Under some conditions on waiting time and welfare
functions, they even recommend subsidizing private provision of care.
Henriet and Rochet (2004)[21] address the question whether public health
insurance is an appropriate instrument for redistribution. They argue that under the
assumption of negative correlation of income and morbidity, theoretically a public
health insurance system financed by taxes can be an efficient mean of redistribution,
complementary to income taxation. Nevertheless examining data from the French
public insurance system, they find out that poor individuals are using less health
services in spite of being in worse health.
We borrow from this kind of models the self-selection mechanisms of the agents
into private provision of the good.
The second strand of literature starts with Rotschild and Stiglitz (1976)[32].
In this paper, they show that asymmetry of information in competitive provision of
insurance leads to suboptimal results. In particular, agents having an advantage over
others cannot get their optimal contract. Using their example of insurance market,
agents with comparatively low risk, willing to buy insurance from a competitive
provider, incur a loss over their fair contract in order to signal themselves as good
risks. This externality, due to the presence of high risk agents in the market, cannot
be avoided under imperfect information. This paper has given rise to an important
literature in economics.
In our model, we will consider the effects of asymmetry of information in
competitive markets, in the presence of public provision.
Glazer and McGuire (2011)[18] model managed competition with demand het-
erogeneity to create contracts in relation to efficiency and fairness in the context of
the recent reform of the American health care system. They consider that het-
erogeneity in demand for health care is not only due to health status but also
other factors which they name taste, represented by income. Efficiency is obtained
through standard utility maximization. Fairness is defined as having ”the sick and
the healthy [paying] the same for plan membership in each plans”. They advocate
for regulated premiums not only for the basic plans but also on the most generous
plans on the stake of efficiency.
From Glazer and McGuire’s paper we borrow a part of the structure of the
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model but we are analyzing different health systems. They describe a health system
in which every individual has to buy an insurance having two options: the high
(golden) or the low (silver) quality plan. The model is constructed in such a way that
the golden plan is optimal for high income individuals whereas the silver plan is the
optimal one for the poor independently of their health status. Any rich (high taste
for quality) buying a silver plan or a poor (low taste for quality) buying a golden plan
is inefficient. The system that we are considering is one where everybody is entitled
to use the public services for free. In addition, the rich and only the rich individuals
may opt out to the private sector paying the full price offering the optimal quality
for them. Comparing our model with Glazer and McGuire’s the golden plan would
be equivalent to the one proposed to the rich in the private sector. The quality in
the public sector (due to a small fixed budget constraint) is lower than in the private
sector but it is not necessarily corresponding to the silver plan. First the quality
in the public sector may be also suboptimal for the poor. Second, the quality in
the public sector depends on how many people are treated in this sector. In our
analysis when a rich individual goes to the public sector we identify two types of
inefficiencies. The first one as in Glazer and McGuire is coming from a high taste
individual contracting a suboptimal quality. The second comes form the fact that
it has a negative externality on the rest of the users in the public sector.
The question that we examine, the balance between a subsidy to private
provider and the budget available for public provision, has also been treated empir-
ically. Emerson et al. (2001) [17] study a tax reform in UK that caused the private
health insurance plans premium for over-60 insurees to raise by a large margin. It
impacted negatively the waiting lists (and therefore, the quality) in the public NHS
system. Rodriguez and Stoyanova (2008) [31] study a similar tax reform in Spain
that eliminated a tax deduction for private health insurance expenditures. This
reform induced the Spanish insurees to buy less individual health insurance plans,
and turn to group plans. The effect on participation in private insurance plans was
not significant. Still the reform alleviated the public expenditures on health care. In
contrast, Lopez-Nicola`s and Vera-Hernandez (2008) [27] use micro-simulation on the
same tax reform to examine whether tax subsidies in Catalonia are self-financing,
reducing the public budget for health care. They find that this tax reform was costly
for the public budget.
2.3 The model
We consider three types of players: consumers, public sector and private health
insurance providers. The consumers buy health insurance at a given quality. The
private providers sell insurance for health care at a given quality for a fair premium.
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The public sector (or government) provides care (in an NHS way) at a given quality,
lower than the private sector quality, for free. Quality is defined as the health
expenditures per illness episode. The government can also offer a subsidy to reduce
the price paid in the private sector.
2.3.1 The consumer
Consumers are characterized by their health status and their wealth levels. Con-
sumers can be healthy or sick (denoted by i), and rich or poor (denoted by j). There
are then four types of consumers (ij), healthy rich (hr), healthy poor (hp), sick rich
(sr) and sick poor (sp). Health status are modeled through the number of illness
episodes1, θi. Sick consumers have a number of illness episodes of θs, and healthy
consumers of θh, with θs > θh > 0.
For each illness episode, a single unit good of treatment is consumed. The
quality of care q is defined as the health expenditures per illness episode θi. There-
fore, the cost to provide a given level of quality to a given individual for all his illness
episodes is
(2.1) c(q) = θiq
The valuation for quality, influenced linearly by need (i, expected number of
illness episodes) and taste (j, wealth), is vij(q) = θiφj(q). The linearity in terms of
need comes from the assumption of homogeneity in illness episodes across individu-
als. The sick are valuing quality more than the healthy, vsj(q) > vhj(q). The taste
for quality φj(q) is increasing and concave in q, and independent of health status.
The rich are valuing quality more than the poor, vir(q) > vip(q).
If the individual is seeking care from the private sector, he will pay an ex ante
premium P . Net utility Uij is derived from the valuation for quality, minus the
eventual premium.
(2.2) Uij = vij(q)− P
The first best level of quality q∗j maximizes the valuation of quality of a given
individual minus the costs of providing this level of quality to this individual.
Lemma 2.3.1 The first best level of quality is independent of the health status.
This comes from the assumptions that the valuation functions and the costs
are both proportional to the number of illness episodes.
1There are no differences in illness episodes between consumers.
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Figure 2.1: Valuation and cost for quality, and its first-best level, for healthy and
sick rich
2.3.2 The public sector
The government has a fixed budget B. This budget can be used to produce health
care quality and to subsidize the private sector. Public health care is offered as in
an NHS insurance system. The subsidy s is a fixed amount of money per illness
episode treated in the private sector. It modifies the cost function of the private
sector such that it becomes
(2.3) c(q, s) = θi(q − s)
We name Mij the total number of consumers with health status i and wealth
j. We name N the total number of illness episodes in the population. NG is the
total number of illness episodes treated by the public sector (government) and NP
the equivalent in the private sector. We also define Nij as the number of illness
episodes of consumers with health status i and wealth j, with then Nij = θiMij.
This means that N = NG +NP =
∑
ij Nij.
The quality in the public sector is qG.
The budget constraint for the government is thus
(2.4) B ≥ NGqG −NP s
For simplification, poor (low taste) individuals have to rely on public services.
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Due to a liquidity constraint, or because of a systematic underestimation of the risk
by the poor, the state has to provide a minimum level of health care services.
Rich individuals may decide whether they prefer to benefit from the public
sector offering a quality qG, or go to the private sector and pay the market price.
Public providers cannot identify who is rich and who is poor2 but can give incentives
(through the subsidy s) to the rich to go to the private sector. Having the public
service free of charge ensures that all the individuals are willing to get care.
2.3.3 The private sector
The private provision of insurance is competitive. Firms are proposing (an insurance
for) a quality of care qP for an ex ante premium P , in a contract (qP , P ), in order
to maximize their profits.
Lemma 2.3.2 Under perfect competition, and no asymmetric information, private
providers offer a fair premium and the first best quality for the rich.
Lemma 2.3.2 assures that under perfect competition (therefore zero profit) and
no distortions, qP = q∗r and Pi = θiq
∗
r . Every rich consumer pays its expected costs
in the private market.
2.3.4 Timing of the game
The timing of the game is as follows. The government announces a level of subsidy
per illness episode treated in the private sector. Then each firm in the private sector
announces the contract it proposes. The quality in the public sector and the number
of rich consumers that decide to buy insurance from each sector are simultaneously
solved. Rich individuals may switch from one sector to another until there is no
marginal individual who would find profitable to switch.
2.3.5 Equilibrium under perfect risk selection and no sub-
sidy
This section will define a simple baseline case. Under perfect risk selection, there
is no information asymmetry. The private firm can discriminate contracts (q, P )
between sick and healthy rich individuals (the poor have no access to the private
2For instance because of an important underground economy, or because the public service is
politically defined as universal.
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market). Lemmas 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 explain that the quality provided by the private
firms to sick and healthy rich will be the same. However, the premiums will be
different. For this baseline case, we also consider that the public sector does not
offer any subsidy (s = 0). In this case, depending on the level of the public budget
B, the rich will join or not the private sector. A high public budget, and thus a high
quality of public care, induces the rich to enter the public sector.
Poor individuals have to rely on the public providers. Rich individuals maxi-
mize their utility, choosing between the public sector quality for free (qG) and the
private sector quality (q∗r) for a fair premium (θiq
∗
r). We define q
G
ir
as the minimum
quality a rich individual may accept from the public sector providers. Formally, the
minimum acceptable quality (MAQ) qG
ir
is defined as the quality level at which a
rich individual is indifferent between the public and the private sector.
(2.5) vir(q
G
ir
) = vir(q
∗
r)− Pi(q∗r)
Below this quality level in the public sector (qG < qG
ir
), a rich individual will be
induced to go to the private sector. Above this quality level (qG > qG
ir
), the private
sector cannot offer a fair contract (q∗r , P ) that attracts him, and he will get care
from the public providers, together with the poor.
Lemma 2.3.3 Under fair prices, without asymmetric information, the minimum
quality the rich individuals are accepting from the public sector qG
ir
is independent
from the health status, qG
hr
= qG
sr
.
As in lemma 2.3.1, the linearity in the valuation and cost functions leads to
the result.
We now consider 3 cases: very low public budget, very high public budget and
an intermediary public budget.
If the public budget is very low (lower than B1)
3 , the quality in the public sec-
tor (qG) will be lower than the MAQ, qG < qG
ir
, even if the rich buy already insurance
from the private sector. The rich individuals have no incentives to switch sectors.
In equilibrium, all the poor individuals will get care from the public providers at
quality qG, and all the rich individuals will buy insurance from the private sector at
quality q∗r and premium θiq
∗
r .
3B1 is the public budget needed to provide q
G
ir
to the poor population in the public sector,
B < B1 = q
G
ir
(Nhp +Nsp).
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If the public budget is very high (higher than B2)
4 , the quality proposed in
the public sector (qG) will higher than the MAQ, qG < qG
ir
, even if the rich buy
already from the public sector. The rich individuals have no incentives to switch
sectors. In equilibrium, all the individuals, rich and poor, will get care from the
public providers, at quality qG.
The last case is when the public budget is in a middle range (B1 < B < B2). If
all the individuals are getting care from the public providers, the quality is too low to
be accepted by the rich. They will then switch toward the private sector. However, if
all the rich individuals are getting insurance from the private sector, the free quality
in the public sector is appealing to them. They have then incentives to switch back
toward the public sector. In equilibrium, only a fraction of the rich would buy
private insurance, and the remainder will get public care, together with the poor.
Utilities in both sectors have to be equivalent for the rich vir(q
G) = vir(q
∗
r)− θiq∗r .
Proposition 2.3.4 Under perfect risk selection and no subsidy, with public budget
in a middle range (B1 < B < B2), part of the rich individuals are getting insurance
in the private sector and the other part are getting care from the public sector. This
means that NP < Nhr +Nsr and N
G > Nhp +Nsp. The quality in the public sector
is equal to qG
ir
.
If a larger part of rich was getting care from the public sector, the quality in
the public sector would deteriorate, and the private sector would become attractive
for the rich. If a lower part of the rich was getting care from the public sector, the
mirror situation would happen.
Figure 2.2 shows comparative statics, and the equilibrium quality in the public
sector qG, given the public budget B.
When the budget is low, B < B1, an increase in budget is reflected in the
quality of the public sector at a rate ∂q
G
∂B
= 1
Nhp+Nsp
. An increase in the budget
is translated into better quality as the number of illness episodes treated remains
unchanged (only the poor get treated in the public sector).
Once the public budget is greater than B2, all individuals (rich and poor) are
insured in the public sector so that, as the public budget increases, no new people
enter the public sector. Therefore the quality in the public sector increases at a rate
∂qG
∂B
= 1
N
(the increase is shared between the total number of illness episodes in the
population).
If the public budget is between B1 and B2, the rich individuals are attracted
by the public sector as the budget increases. The quality in the public sector is
4B2 is the public budget needed to provide q
G
ir
to the whole population in the public sector,
B > B2 = q
G
ir
N .
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Figure 2.2: Public sector quality and budget
temporarily above qG
ir
, and it attracts more rich individuals. Because the quality
decreases when more illness episodes are treated, this brings back the quality to
qG
ir
, where no additional rich individual is willing to enter the public sector. In
equilibrium, the marginal increase of the public budget on the quality in the public
sector is zero, ∂q
G
∂B
= 0.
In the remainder of the model, we will restrict the discussion to a public
budget such that it cannot provide a quality beyond the first best quality for the
poor, B ≤ Npq∗p. We ensure that the marginal value of a quality increase in the
public sector is greater for the poor than its costs.
2.4 Implementing a subsidy
2.4.1 Perfect risk selection
With a limited budget, it is still perfectly possible that the rich have incentives to
get care from the public sector, because it is free of charge. But because the budget
is fixed, treating more people (or a greater number of illness episodes) results in a
lower quality in the public sector. This is not the case in the private sector, where
every individual has to pay the amount needed to treat his own illness episodes.
The most efficient outcome5, is for the rich to get insurance in the private
5Maximizing a utilitarian social welfare function of the total surplus from health care over costs,
whether it is publicly or privately financed
max
∑
ij
(v(qij)− c(qij))
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sector, while the poor are treated in the public sector. The rich would get their first
best level of quality, while the poor would get the highest possible quality given the
public budget B and their liquidity constraint.
The government, willing to maximize the level of quality offered to the poor,
will offer a subsidy just sufficient for all the rich to be willing to buy the private
insurance quality. This will reduce the number of people seeking care in the public
sector, therefore improving its quality. It will also reduce the price paid in the
private sector by the rich. This is Pareto improving, as long as the subsidy is less
costly to the government than treating those not willing to switch in the absence of
a subsidy.
Lemma 2.4.1 Under perfect risk selection and no asymmetry of information, it is
always cheaper for the public sector to subsidize the rich so that they opt out for the
private sector rather than treating them directly.
The budget constraint of the government leads the public quality to be lower
than the first best quality. The definition of the first best level of quality ensures
that the utility (net of costs) of q∗r is bigger than the utility (net of costs) of the
public sector quality qG. The rich have a positive willingness to pay over the costs
of public quality to get this increased utility.
With such a subsidy, each unit of treatment is reimbursed by the government
an amount s. The cost function, defined by equation 2.1, is modified such that, for
the private sector, the cost function is defined by equation 2.3.
The subsidy does not affect the first best level of quality of the consumers
(particularly the rich). It corresponds to a lump-sum transfer per illness episode. It
therefore has no distortive effects6. However, because of perfect competition, it will
reduce the premium Pi paid to buy the first best level of quality q
∗
r in the private
sector. With a subsidy s, this premium becomes
(2.6) Pi = θi(q
∗
r − s)
Note that, as we consider perfect risk selection, the premium paid by healthy
and sick rich are different, even though the quality level is the same.
As previously, the equilibrium is attained when the rich individuals are in-
different between getting care in the public and insurance from the private sector,
6The first best level of quality without a subsidy is defined as q∗j = argmaxq(vij(q)−θiq). With
a subsidy, it becomes q∗j = argmaxq(vij(q) − θi(q − s)). The derivatives of these functions with
respect to q are equal.
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taking now into account the subsidy s. Substituting the fair price with a subsidy,
defined in equation 2.6, into the indifference condition 2.5, we get
(2.7) vir(q
G
ir
) = vir(q
∗
r)− θi(q∗r − s)
Equation 2.7 implicitly defines the function qG
ir
(s), which relates the MAQ with
the subsidy level. Note that lemma 2.3.3 still applies, the MAQ are independent
from the health status.
Lemma 2.4.2 The minimum acceptable quality in the public sector qG
ir
(s) increases
with s at an increasing rate,
∂qG
ir
(s)
∂s
> 0, and
∂qG
ir
(s)2
∂2s
> 0.
The bigger the subsidy, the less costly it is for the rich to get insurance in the
private sector, so the quality they are ready to accept from the public sector needs
to be higher.
With a subsidy respecting the indifference condition 2.7, the rich individuals
are buying insurance from the private sector and the poor are receiving it from the
public sector. This means that NG = Nhp +Nsp and N
P = Nhr +Nsr. The budget
constraint of the government, equation 2.4, can be rewritten
(2.8) qGp =
B − s(Nhr +Nsr)
Nhp +Nsp
This defines qGp (s), a budget constraint that would represent the quality in the
public sector, available to the poor, as a function of the subsidy s, when all rich
individuals are in the private sector. The quality affordable in the public sector
qGp (s) decreases linearly with the subsidy s.
In figure 2.3, we plot the two functions relating the subsidy level s to the
quality in the public sector qG. The first one is the minimum acceptable quality
(MAQ) for the rich, as a function of the subsidy qG
ir
(s). Quality needs to be below
this level for the rich to be willing to buy private insurance. The second one is the
budget constraint of the government, given the subsidy, qGp (s). Quality also needs to
be below this line to respect it. Let us recall that the government objective function
is to maximize the quality available to the poor in the public sector, qG.
The optimal level of subsidy, s∗, is such that functions qG
ir
(s) and qGp (s) cross.
At this subsidy level, the quality is maximized for the poor in the public sector,
and the rich are indifferent between the quality in the public sector and the private
market quality.
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Figure 2.3: Public sector quality and subsidy
Proposition 2.4.3 Under perfect risk selection, a subsidy s∗, defined as qG
ir
(s∗) =
qGp (s
∗), maximizes the objective function of the government. For s∗ > 0, it is also
an improvement in a Pareto sense over the no subsidy case.
At qG
ir
(s∗) = qGp (s
∗), the quality in the public sector is maximized, as the
rich are opting out, and they are cheaper to subsidize than to treat. The poor are
therefore better off. A positive subsidy can only increase the welfare of the rich.
The poor are getting a higher quality, because the rich are out of the public
sector. The rich are not willing to participate in the public sector, even though
the quality increases as a result of the subsidy policy. By construction, they are
indifferent between the public and the private sector provision.
Note that it would be perfectly possible to observe a case where s∗ < 0, the
subsidy being in effect a tax. This would mean that the public budget is low enough,
such that the budget constraint qGp (s) defined in equation 2.3 crosses the minimum
acceptable quality for the rich qG
r
(s) defined in equation 2.7 at a point where s < 0.
2.4.2 Solidarity between sick and healthy individuals in the
private sector
In the previous section, the healthy and sick rich were paying different premium
for the same quality level. Regarding health care, a normative rule that is widely
accepted is solidarity among sick and healthy patients. The government might be
willing to impose solidarity in the private sector, between healthy and sick rich.
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Discrimination based on health status is not possible, either because of asymmetry
of information or because regulation prevents it. Additionally, the government will
forbid competition in contracts (q, P ), allowing only competition in prices. In such
cases, the risks are pooled in the private sector. The premium is the same for every
consumer seeking private insurance. Because of perfect competition, the firms will
then rely on average cost pricing. Another explanation would be the existence of
a (perfect) risk adjustment mechanism. Such a mechanism will smooth the costs
among the risk types in the private sector, and also lead to average cost pricing.
We impose in this section that the private firms cannot offer different contracts
to the healthy and sick individuals7. The quality level is q∗r . The fair premium for
any level of quality is therefore the average cost for all the individuals buying the
private product. The subsidy provided by the government can induce the rich and
healthy individuals (the pivotal consumers) to join the private sector (effectively
subsidizing the sick), increasing the utility in both the public sector and private
sector.
Average cost pricing implies that the premium paid by healthy and sick rich
opting out is the same. But its level depends on the participation of the healthy rich
in the private market. If all rich (healthy and sick) individuals are participating in
the private sector, the price would be equal to the average cost, Ph(q
∗
r) = Ps(q
∗
r) =
Nrs+Nrh
Mrs+Mrh
(q∗r − s). If only the sick rich buy private insurance, the equilibrium price
becomes Ps,q∗r = θs(q
∗
r − s). Because the sick rich have a higher valuation for quality
than the healthy rich , they are the first ones to join the private sector. Their
willingness to pay for quality is higher. At some levels of prices, the rich and healthy
are still better off in the public sector.
We will now have two indifference conditions for the healthy and rich out
of equation 2.5, one where all the rich (healthy and sick) are treated in the private
sector, and one where only the sick rich buy the private insurance. The MAQ for the
sick rich, when the healthy rich are not participating in the private sector, is qG
sr
(s),
defined through equation 2.7. When the healthy rich are participating in the private
sector, the sick rick are subsidized, and therefore anyway willing to participate in the
private sector. The healthy rich face different prices in the private sector, depending
on whether they are already opting out, or whether they are publicly treated. Their
MAQ are different.
vhr(q
G
hr
) = vhr(q
∗
r)−
Nsr +Nhr
Msr +Mhr
(q∗r − s)(2.9)
vhr(q
G
hr
) = vhr(q
∗
r)− θs(q∗r − s)(2.10)
7Note that we also assume that private providers cannot specialize into treating only the sick
or only the healthy.
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We name qG[1]
hr
(s) and qG[2]
hr
(s) the implicit functions defined by equations 2.9
and 2.10 respectively. Those equations relate the MAQ for healthy rich individuals
to be indifferent with the private sector at a fair market price, with them being
in the private sector (qG[1]
hr
(s), equation 2.9) or not (qG[2]
hr
(s), equation 2.10). The
solidarity policy represents an increase in the premium for healthy rich individuals
with respect to the perfect risk selection case. It induces the functions qG[1]
hr
(s) and
qG[2]
hr
(s) to be shifted to the right of the qG
sr
(s) function8.
Lemma 2.4.4 Under a solidarity policy, the minimum acceptable qualities qG[1]
hr
(s)
and qG[2]
hr
(s) in the public sector for the healthy rich are increasing and convex in s.
At any subsidy level s, we have that qG
sr
(s) > qG[1]
hr
(s) > qG[2]
hr
(s).
The bigger the subsidy, the less costly it is for the rich to get insurance in
the private sector, so the quality they are ready to accept from the public sector
needs to be higher, irrespective of their health status. Because of the health risks
ordering, it is easier to convince the sick to opt out than the rich. At the same
time, it is easier to convince a healthy to opt out when other healthy already opted
out, improving the risk pool in the private sector. The healthy rich have to decide
between subsidizing the sick rich and giving up on the additional quality available
in the private sector.
We also define the government budget constraint when healthy rich are not
participating in the private market, qGhr(s).
(2.11) qGhr(s) =
B − sNsr
Nhp +Nsp +Nhr
The quality affordable in the public sector when the healthy rich are also
treated by public providers, qGhr(s), decreases with the subsidy s. If all the rich
(healthy and sick) are opting out, the budget constraint of the government is qGp ,
defined by equation 2.8.
In figure 2.4, we plot the MAQ for the sick rich qG
sr
, for the healthy rich when
only sick rich are in the private sector qG[1]
hr
(s) and for the healthy rich when all
the rich opt out qG[2]
hr
(s). We also plot the government budget constraint when the
rich are all participating in the private sector qGp (s) and when only the sick rich are
buying private insurance qGhr(s).
At a subsidy level s∗1, the sick rich individuals are willing to leave the public
sector. Because only the sick individuals are in the private sector, the price is high
8Note that, because of Lemma 2.3.3, qG
sr
(s) = qG
ir
(s), as seen in the discrimination case.
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Figure 2.4: Public sector quality and subsidy under health solidarity policy
and the healthy rich do not want to join the private sector. In order to induce
the healthy rich to join the private sector, the level of the subsidy has to reach
s2. At this subsidy level, all the rich (healthy and sick) are willing to join the
private sector. Once the healthy rich switch from the public to the private sector
the average risk in the private sector improves, which leads to a decrease in the
average cost and therefore a decrease in the premium. Thus there is even more
incentives to participate in the private sector. As the risk in the private sector
lowers, the minimum acceptable quality in the public sector for the healthy rich
individuals changes from function q[2]
hr
(s2) (high average cost) to q
[1]
hr
(s2) (low average
cost). Consequently, quality in the public sector jumps from q
G[2]
hr (s2) to q
G[1]
hr (s2).
In order to sustain this equilibrium, the necessary level of subsidy is reduced to s∗3.
A subsidy level s∗3 is not sufficient to induce the healthy rich to move to the private
sector when the average cost is high (only the sick rich are in the private sector).
However, it is sufficient to induce them to stay in the private sector when the average
cost is low (all the rich are in the private sector).
There are two equilibriums, s∗1 where the sick rich are in the private sector,
all the other consumers are in the public sector, and s∗3 where the (healthy and
sick) rich are in the private sectors and the poor in the public sector. It is not
clear which of the two equilibriums would lead to a higher quality in the public
sector (and therefore for the poor). The advantage of the equilibrium s∗3 is that
it reaches the first best quality level q∗r for all rich individuals, and at the same
time the solidarity policy is effective (the healthy subsidize the sick in the private
sector). If qG[1]
hr
(s∗3) > q
G
hr
(s∗1), then s
∗
3 clearly would be Pareto superior to s
∗
1. In this
case, the quality the public sector can offer is higher when all the rich are in the
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private sector. On the contrary, if qG
hr
(s∗1) > q
G[1]
hr
(s∗3), neither of the two equilibrium
would Pareto dominate the other, and there would be a trade off between effectively
implementing solidarity in the private sector (decreasing the premium for the sick
rich) and the welfare of the poor (offering a higher quality in the public sector under
s∗1 than under s
∗
3).
Proposition 2.4.5 There are two potential equilibrium, at s∗1, where the healthy
rich are in the public sector, and s∗3, where all the rich are opting out. If and only
if qG[1]
r
(s∗3) ≥ qGsr(s∗1), then s∗3 is Pareto dominating s∗1.
Because of risk pooling in the private sector, the healthy rich are facing a
tradeoff. Either they accept to subsidize the sick rich, or they give up on the
additional quality that the private sector can offer. Therefore, it is more costly to
subsidize the healthy than the sick. It might be more costly to subsidize them than
to treat them. If it is cheap enough to subsidize them, the poor are better off, and
the sick rich are benefiting from an improved risk pool.
2.4.3 Risk selection with asymmetry of information
In a system where 2 risks types coexist, but the risk type is a private information,
a separating contract is 2nd best efficient and achievable.
In this type of setting, the low-risk type do not get their first best contract.
They however incur a loss to signal their type in an incentive-compatible way. As
under the previous solidarity policy, the healthy rich face the tradeoff of not getting
the higher private quality, or giving up part of this quality to signal themselves as
good risks. We turn to such a framework.
In the public sector, again only one contract is offered. In the private sec-
tor, however, two different contracts are proposed to the rich. They are incentive-
compatible in the sense that sick rich are not willing to buy the contract proposed
to the healthy rich . The sick rich get their first best contract q∗r at a price
Psr = θs(q
∗
r − s). The healthy rich9 are getting a rebate to buy a lower quality
qhr at a price Phr = θh(qhr − s). The incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) is as
follows:
(2.12) vsr(qhr)− P (qhr) ≤ vsr(q∗r)− P (q∗r)
9The healthy rich could not get their first best contract. If it was the case, it would be cheaper
for the sick rich to buy this contract than the one designed for them.
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ICC 2.12 postulates that sick rich people would not benefit if they mimic the
behavior of the healthy. No other ICC is needed, as healthy individuals would have
no interest in reporting that they are sick and paying the premium designed for the
sick. However, equation 2.12 will be binding, and can be rewritten in the form of
an equality, imposing fair premiums.
(2.13) vsr(qhr)− θh(qhr − s)− vsr(q∗) + θs(q∗r − s) = 0
Equation 2.13 implicitly defines a maximum quality qhr(s) that can be offered
to the healthy rich, as a function of the subsidy s. Any fair contract where qhr >
qhr(s) would also attract the sick rich. Quality level qhr(s) is as close as possible to
the first best, while remaining incentive compatible.
Lemma 2.4.6 Under risk selection with asymmetric information, the sick rich are
getting their first-best level of quality, q∗r at a fair premium P (qsr) = θs(q
∗
r − s). The
healthy rich are getting quality qhr(s) at a fair premium P (qhr) = θh(qhr(s)−s). The
decrease in quality incurred by the healthy rich to signal themselves as good risks is
reduced by the subsidy.
Because of incentive compatibility constraints, the healthy rich have to pay a
price to signal themselves as good risks. They are therefore not getting the first
best quality, while the sick rich don’t have this problem. Because of the subsidy, the
premium is reduced for the sick. They are therefore less tempted by a lower quality
at a lower price. This lower quality that the healthy are getting can be higher.
For the rich to be willing to enter the private market, the contract for the
healthy rich has also to satisfy their MAQ.
(2.14) vhr(q
G) = vhr(qhr)− Phr
Equation 2.14 implicitly defines the function qG
hr
(s), which relates the minimum
acceptable quality level in the public sector for the healthy rich with the subsidy
level s. The minimum acceptable quality for the sick rich, qG
sr
(s), is again defined
through equation 2.7. Note that, if the quality in the public sector is such that the
healthy rich are willing to enter the private market, the sick rich, that get their first
best contract, are anyway willing to enter the private market, qG
sr
(s) > qG
hr
(s).
Lemma 2.4.7 Under risk selection with asymmetric information, the minimum ac-
ceptable quality in the public sector for the healthy rich is increasing with s at an
increasing rate,
∂qG
hr
(s)
∂s
> 0 . Healthy rich are pivotal, qG
sr
(s) > qG
hr
(s).
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The bigger the subsidy, the less costly it is for the rich to get insurance in the
private sector, so the quality they are ready to accept from the public sector needs
to be higher. Healthy rich are not getting their first best quality, but still paying
fair premiums. Their utility in the private sector is lower than the utility of the sick,
and they are therefore more easily interested by the public sector quality.
As in the solidarity setting presented earlier, the budget constraint when only
the sick rich are treated in the private sector qGhr(s) is defined in equation 2.11. The
budget constraint where all the rich are treated in the private sector qGp (s) is defined
in equation 2.8.
In figure 2.5, we plot the MAQ for the sick rich participating alone in the
private sector qG
sr
and the MAQ for the healthy rich also participating qG
hr
(s).
The government budget constraints when the rich are all participating in the
private sector qGp (s) and when the healthy rich are instead participating in the public
sector, but the sick rich are still participating in the private sector, qGhr(s) are also
represented.
Figure 2.5: Public sector quality and subsidy under separating contracts
Again two equilibriums are possible. The first equilibrium is when only the
sick rich are buying private quality care through insurance, at a subsidy level s∗1. At
this subsidy level, the healthy rich are not willing to enter the private sector, because
the quality in the public sector is above their minimum acceptable quality q
hr
(s).
The equilibrium is sustainable, as the budget constraint qGhr(s) assumes a subsidy
only for the sick rich, and treatment for the healthy rich. The second equilibrium,
at subsidy level s∗2, takes place when all the rich are participating in the private
sector. The MAQ that matters is the one of the healthy rich qG
hr
(s). Subsidy level
s∗2 is also feasible, lying on the budget constraint q
G
p (s). It is not clear which of the
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two equilibriums would lead to a higher quality in the public sector (and therefore
for the poor).
Proposition 2.4.8 There are two potential equilibrium, at s∗1, where the healthy
rich are in the public sector, and s∗2, where all the rich are opting out. If and only
if qG
hr
(s∗2) ≥ qGsr(s∗1), then s∗2, where the healthy rich are participating in the private
market, is Pareto dominating s∗1, where the healthy rich are receiving public care.
Again, the healthy rich face a tradeoff between signalling themselves as good
risks or giving up on the additional private sector quality. Because of it, it is more
costly to subsidize the healthy than the sick. It might be more costly to subsidize
them than to treat them. If it is cheap enough to subsidize them, the poor are better
off.
2.5 Model example
To illustrate our insights we introduce the following example where the value func-
tion for quality takes the form vir(q) = θikq
1
a . The parameter a > 1 is an indicator
of the concavity (inverse elasticity) of the utility function with respect to the quality
of health care10. k > 0, is a scaling factor for the utility function with respect to the
marginal utility of quality. Based on this example, we want to illustrate some pre-
dictions for different budget sizes, proportions of the population of sick and healthy,
rich and poor and difference in the number of illness episodes between the healthy
and sick individuals.
We set specific values for the parameters in the reference case of our example,
a = 2, k = 8, θh = 4, θs = 5, Msp = Msr = Mhp = Mhr = 25. Finally, the budget
is such that the quality in the public sector, if all individuals are receiving public
care, is 1/4 of the optimal quality q∗r , B =
0.25q∗r
θsMsp+θsMsr+θhMhp+θhMhr
. This imposes
that the quality of the public sector, when treating all the agents in the population,
is standardized for all variations of the model that we will introduce. This set of
parameters leads to q∗r = 16, q
G = 4 if everybody (rich and poor) is in the public
sector. All the potential equilibrium, and the values of qG and s associated with
them, are listed in the appendix. For example, under perfect information, with the
set of parameters listed above, qG(s∗) = 5.40 and s∗ = 2.60.
With those values, we do not pretend to calibrate the model in comparison
to the reality; we rather sketch what may be the possible scenarios with different
relative size of the parameters.
10We need that a > θsθh , while not being ”‘too big”’. If this is not the case, we end up with weird
solutions, implying negative utilities, or negative private sector quality.
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In the subsequent sections, we are going to analyze the effect of changing one of
the parameters (B, Mij, θi) on the potential equilibrium under perfect information,
solidarity policy and separating contracts.
2.5.1 Budget change
In figure 2.6, we compare the reference case with a budget that is reduced to 20%
of the baseline budget. The result is that no positive subsidy s could improve the
quality in the public sector, for none of the three cases analyzed: perfect information,
solidarity policy and separating contracts. In fact, if a tax on the private providers
is possible (s < 0), it would increase the quality in the public sector.
In the perfect information scenario, reducing the public budget to 20% of its
original value leads to a quality reduction in the public sector of less than a half,
from 5.40 to 3.22. The slower decline in the public sector quality is explained by a
change in the optimal subsidy from 2.60 to - 1.63 monetary units.
With a higher budget, the subsidy is less costly than treating people in the
public sector. With a high budget the quality in the public sector is 4 if rich and
poor are treated in the public sector. Having a subsidy of 2.60 monetary units
induces the rich to opt out to the private sector. The quality in the public sector
becomes 5.40. The subsidy is less than half of what rich would cost if they were
treated in the public sector.
In the solidarity policy and separating contracts scenarios, we also observe that
the quality reduction in the public sector is lower than the reduction in the budget.
The budget constraints qGp (s) and q
G
hr(s) keep the same slopes but they are shifted
to the left. The MAQ functions are independent of the budget size.
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Figure 2.6: Example different size in budget
High budget Low budget
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2.5.2 Different proportions of rich and poor
We revert to the original set of parameters. Changing the proportion in the number
of rich and poor is reflected in a change of the slopes of the budget constraints qGp (s)
and qGhr(s). The bigger the share of rich people, the steeper the slopes of the budget
constraints, therefore the potential benefit of increasing quality in the public sector
through a subsidy policy is higher when the proportion of poor is low.
In figure 2.7, we change the share of poor and rich. On the left hand side, the
poor represent 80% of the population. On the right hand side, they represent only
20 percent. The budget remains unchanged in either case, such that if everyone is
treated in the public sector, the quality qG would be equal to 4.
Under perfect information, the optimal subsidy and the quality in the public
sector is higher when the share of poor is lower. In our example, qG(s∗) = 5.75, and
it drops to 4.43 when poor represent 80% of the population. The optimal subsidy
changes from 2.29 to 0.83 as the share of poor increases. This result again illustrates
the fact that it is cheaper to subsidize the private sector than to treat people in the
public facilities. Having less poor individuals reduces the number of people that
would get treated in the public sector if the subsidy policy takes place.
We show these results for the solidarity policy and separating contracts scenar-
ios, but the analysis does not change, except for the scale of the potential benefits
of applying the optimal subsidy.
46CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL SUBSIDY FOR PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE PROVIDERS
Figure 2.7: Example different proportion rich poor
High proportion of poor High proportion of rich
2.5. MODEL EXAMPLE 47
2.5.3 Different proportions of healthy and sick
In figure 2.8, we change the proportion of sick and healthy people. On the left hand
side, sick individuals only represent 20% of the population. On the right hand side,
sick individuals represent 80 percent of the population. Changing the proportion of
sick does not have any impact under perfect information (because B is standardized
with respect to the number of illness episodes). The optimal subsidy is 2.60 and the
quality in the public sector is 5.40, regardless of the proportion of healthy and sick.
Under the solidarity policy, we observe that with a low proportion of sick in-
dividuals, the equilibrium where healthy and sick rich are opting out for the private
sector reports higher quality in the public sector, 5.16. When the sick rich are alone
in the private sector, the quality in the public sector is only 4.43 units. The par-
ticipation of both groups in the private sector makes the solidarity policy effective.
In contrast, when the proportion of sick people is 80 percent, the quality in the
public sector is going to be higher if only the sick rich are in the private sector, 5.22
compared to 4.41 when all the rich are seeking care through the private insurance.
The separating contracts scenario shows a similar pattern. If the share of sick
is high, the equilibrium with only sick people in the private sector reports higher
quality in the public sector than having all rich in the private sector. And if the share
of sick is low, the equilibrium with all the rich in the private sector is preferable.
Comparing the solidarity and the separating contracts scenarios, with a low
share of sick people, the solidarity policy reports higher quality in the public sector
and is Pareto superior. In contrast, if all rich people are in the private sector, a
high share of sick people leads, in the separating contract scenario, to report higher
quality in the public sector, which is better for the poor. This comes from the fact
the MAQ for the healthy rich, when all rich individuals are in the private sector, is
shifted toward the right in the solidarity policy scenario. In the separating contracts
scenario, the same MAQ is independent of the share of healthy and sick people.
When there are few sick, it is interesting to note that the solidarity policy,
putting barriers to efficiency in the private sector, leads to a higher public quality
(qG(s∗) = 5.16) than the separating contracts (qG(s∗) = 5.00). It is therefore Pareto
superior.
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Figure 2.8: Example different proportion healthy sick
High proportion of healthy High proportion of sick
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2.5.4 Different gap on the number of illness episodes be-
tween the healthy and sick individuals
We illustrate the implications of having a greater gap between the healthy and the
sick in terms of illness episodes in figure 2.9. On the left hand side, the sick have
66% more illness episodes than the healthy, θs = 5 and θh = 3. On the right hand
side, they only 11% more, θs = 5 and θh = 4.5.
Under perfect information, there is no change, as the gap between the healthy
and sick increases. On the other hand in the solidarity policy and separating con-
tracts scenarios, we observe drastic implications.
In the solidarity policy scenario, the distance between the MAQ for healthy
and sick rich expands very fast, as the gap in the number of illness episodes increases.
This makes it hard to convince the healthy rich individuals to opt out for the private
sector. The subsidy is 4, the same as the cost of treating everybody in the public
sector. If only sick rich are in the public sector, public quality becomes 4.98. This
is better than giving incentives for the healthy rich to opt out for the private sector.
The solidarity policy is not effective and everybody is worse off than in the perfect
information scenario.
When the gap in the number of illness episodes is small, on the contrary, it is
preferable, in terms of public quality, to induce the healthy rich to opt out as well.
Quality becomes qG(s∗) = 5.14 when the healthy rich are opting out, rather than
4.85 when they are getting treated in the public sector.
In the separating contracts scenario, the distance between the MAQ for the
sick and healthy rich expands as the difference in the number of illness episodes
increases. But this increase is slower than in the solidarity policy. The analysis
remains comparable to the solidarity scenario.
If the gap in illness episodes is big, an effective solidarity policy is very costly
in terms of public quality compared with a situation where only the sick rich are
opting out. In this case, letting the market set up separating contracts is beneficial
for the public quality. If the gap in illness episodes is small, the solidarity policy
can be effectively implemented, leading to a higher public quality when all the rich
opt out. However, the separating contracts scenario is still better.
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Figure 2.9: Example different gap on the illness episodes
High difference in illness episodes Low difference in illness episodes
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the public provision of health insurance with heteroge-
neous agents (in wealth and health status) in a context where private and public
providers coexist. Public provision is universal and free. Poor individuals have to
rely on public services. Rich individuals may opt out to private providers by paying
a premium. Quality is defined as health expenditures per illness episode.
We showed that under perfect information giving a subsidy to the private
sector, such that no rich individual would demand public treatment, is Pareto im-
proving, increasing the quality in the public sector which is better for the poor. If
health status is not verifiable (asymmetric information), the maximum quality in
the public sector is lower than in the perfect information case. It is not longer true
that a subsidy that induces all the rich to opt out maximizes the quality in the
public sector. It may be that the quality in the public sector is maximized with a
subsidy where only the sick rich individuals get private insurance.
Under asymmetry of information, we studied scenarios where competition in
contracts is prevented (solidarity policy) and permitted (separating contracts). Un-
der the solidarity policy, the optimal level of subsidy is more sensitive to the pro-
portion of sick and healthy people and to the difference in the number of illness
episodes than under separating contract. Under separating contracts, a positive
subsidy will reduce the costs of the healthy rich to signal themselves as good risks.
If the level of subsidy is such that all rich are insured in the private sector, with a
low proportion of sick people and low difference in illness episodes between sick and
healthy, preventing competition in contracts is Pareto improving.
This result implies that the quality in the public sector, available to the poor,
can be higher in a third best world than in a second best situation. A first-best
situation is not achievable in this model due to fixed public budget and congestion
in the public sector. In a second-best world, perfect information leads to all the rich
opting out. With asymmetric information, it is possible to introduce redistribution
from the healthy rich toward the poor and the sick rich. This depends on the
proportion of healthy and sick individuals as well as on the difference in the number
of illness episodes between the healthy and the sick.
We made some simplifying assumptions. First, our model relies on constant
returns to scale technology for the production of quality. There are also only two
wealth levels and two health statuses, rather than a continuum. There is perfect
identification of an illness episode, for instance in terms of severity, or discretionary
power of the physician. Changing some of those assumptions may have implications
on our conclusions.
We discuss the implications of a public subsidy to private providers in terms of
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health insurance. This analysis could also apply to other domains, such as education,
child care or elderly care.
This model permits to illustrate in a simple framework that public support to
private providers can be justified. If a private good is an alternative to the public
provision, a subsidy that reduces the price of the private alternative might free
valuable resources. These resources can then be reinvested in the public provision,
hopefully improving its quality.
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2.7 Appendix
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Lemma 2.3.1
The first best level of quality is independent of the health status.
The optimal quality maximizes the valuation of care over its costs, vij(q) −
cij(q). Because valuation is defined as vij(q) = θiφj(q), the following holds true:
vhj = θhφj(q) = θh
vsj(q)
θs
. This leads to
vhj(q)
θh
=
vsj(q)
θs
.
q∗hj = argmax
q
[vhj(q)− θhq]
= argmax
q
[
(vhj(q)− θhq)
(
θs
θh
)]
= argmax
q
[vsj(q)− θsq]
= q∗sj
Lemma 2.3.2
Under perfect competition, and no asymmetric information, private providers offer
a fair premium and the first best quality for the rich.
Because of perfect competition, the zero-profit condition applies. This leads
to, under perfect competition,
Π = P (q)− c(q) = 0
This implies fair premium.
Because of fair premium, any contract that does not maximize the surplus of
quality over its costs will be suboptimal, and no agent will be interested in it. Only
q∗j can be offered. Because only the rich have access to the private market, only q
∗
r
can be supplied.
Lemma 2.3.3
Under fair prices, without asymmetric information, the minimum quality the rich
individuals are accepting from the public sector qG
ir
is independent from the health
status, qG
hr
= qG
sr
.
qG
hr
(s) and qG
sr
(s) are implicitly defined by the functions:
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F 1(qG
hr
, s) = vhr(q
G
hr
)− vhr(q∗r) + θh(q∗ − s) = 0
F 2(qG
sr
, s) = vsr(q
G
sr
)− vsr(q∗r) + θs(q∗ − s) = 0
Then, using as in Lemma 2.3.1 the condition that
vhj(q)
θh
=
vsj(q)
θs
:
F 1(qG
hr
, s) = vhr(q
G
hr
)− vhr(q∗r) + θh(q∗ − s)
=
[
vhr(q
G
hr
)− vhr(q∗r) + θh(q∗ − s)
]( θs
θh
)
= vsr(q
G
sr
)− vsr(q∗r) + θs(q∗ − s)
= F 2(qG
sr
, s)
Proposition 2.3.4
Under perfect risk selection and no subsidy, with public budget in a middle range
(B1 < B < B2), part of the rich individuals are getting insurance in the private
sector and the other part are getting care from the public sector. This means that
NP < Nhr + Nsr and N
G > Nhp + Nsp. The quality in the public sector is equal to
qG
ir
.
If B > B1 = q
G
ir
(Nhp + Nsp), and only the poor are supplied by the public
sector, then qG = B
Nhp+Nsp
> qG
ir
. This induces rich to enter the public sector.
If B < B2 = q
G
ir
N and all the population (rich and poor) are supplied in the
private sector, then qG = B
N
> qG
ir
. This induces rich to opt out for the private
sector.
Therefore, for B1 < B < B2, using the fact that poor cannot opt out, there is
necessarily a fraction of the rich in each sector, NP < Nhr+Nsr and N
G > Nhp+Nsp.
To maintain only a fraction of the rich in the both sectors, rich have to be
indifferent between both sectors. From their indifference condition 2.5, qG = qG
ir
Lemma 2.4.1
Under perfect risk selection and no assymetry of information, it is always cheaper
for the public sector to subsidize the rich so that they opt out for the private sector
rather than treating them directly.
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The subsidy needed to induce the rich to opt out is such that
vir(q
G(s)) = vir(q
∗
r)− θi(q∗r − s)
The definition of first best quality q∗r implies that,
vir(q
∗
r)− θiq∗r ≥ vir(qG(s))− θiqG(s)
Combining these equations implies
vir(q
∗
r)− θiq∗r ≥ vir(q∗r)− θi(q∗r − s)− θiqG(s)
θiq
G(s) ≥ θis
Strict inequality is ensured for qG(s) 6= q∗r . The budget condition B < q∗pN
and the assumption that vir(q) > vip(q) ensure it.
Lemma 2.4.2
The minimum acceptable quality in the public sector qG
ir
(s) increases with s at an
increasing rate,
∂qG
ir
(s)
∂s
> 0, and
∂qG
ir
(s)2
∂2s
> 0.
qG
ir
(s) is implicitly defined by
F 3(qG
ir
, s) = vir(q
G
ir
)− vir(q∗) + θi(q∗r − s) = 0
The implicit function theorem and the assumptions that
∂vij(q)
∂q
> 0 and
∂2vij(q)
∂q2
<
0 imply that
∂qG
ir
(s)
∂s
=
−∂F 3(qGir,s)
∂s
∂F 3(qG
ir
,s)
∂qG
ir
=
θi
vir(qGir(s))
′ > 0
∂2qG
ir
(s)
∂s2
= −θi︸︷︷︸
<0
[
vir
(
qG
ir
(s)
)′]−2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
vir(q
G
ir
(s))′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0
Proposition 2.4.3
Under perfect risk selection, a subsidy s∗, defined as qG
ir
(s∗) = qGp (s
∗), maximizes the
objective function of the government. For s∗ > 0, it is also an improvement in a
Pareto sense over the no subsidy case
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The maximization program of the government is as follows
maxsq
G(s)
s.t. qG(s) ≤ qG
ir
(s)
qG(s) ≤ qGp (s)
Because of lemma 2.4.2 (MAQ increases with s) and the fact that qGp (s) de-
creases linearly with the subsidy s, qG
ir
(s) and qGp (s) have a single crossing point,
(s, qG(s)). The maximum attainable qG is the crossing point.
If s∗ > 0 maximizes the objective function of the government, qG(s∗) > qG(0).
The poor are better off. Because the utility of the rich is identical, irrespective of
the sector the seek care from (from the MAQ), an increase in public quality qG is
also beneficial for them. If the optimal subsidy is positive, it is an improvement in
a Pareto sense.
Lemma 2.4.4
Under a solidarity policy, the minimum acceptable qualities qG[1]
hr
(s) and qG[2]
hr
(s) in
the public sector for the healthy rich are increasing and convex in s. At any subsidy
level s, we have that qG
sr
(s) > qG[1]
hr
(s) > qG[2]
hr
(s).
qG[1]
hr
(s) is implicitly defined by
F 4(qG[1]
hr
, s) = vhr(q
G[1]
hr
)− vhr(q∗r) +
Nsr +Nhr
Msr +Mhr
(q∗r − s) = 0
The implicit function theorem and the assumptions that
∂vij(q)
∂q
> 0 and
∂2vij(q)
∂q2
<
0 imply the result as in Lemma 2.4.2.
qG[2]
hr
(s) is implicitly defined by
F 5(qG[2]
hr
, s) = vhr(q
G[2]
hr
)− vhr(q∗r) + θs(q∗r − s) = 0
The implicit function theorem and the assumptions that
∂vij(q)
∂q
> 0 and
∂2vij(q)
∂q2
<
0 imply the result as in Lemma 2.4.2.
From Lemma 2.3.3, qG
sr
= qG
hr
where qG
hr
is defined in the perfect information
(baseline) setting, implicitly from F 1(qG
hr
, s) = vhr(q
G
hr
) − vhr(q∗r) + θh(q∗ − s) = 0.
Because θh <
Nsr+Nhr
Msr+Mhr
< θs, and because
∂vij(q)
∂q
> 0, we have qG
sr
(s) > qG[1]
hr
(s) >
qG[2]
hr
(s).
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Proposition 2.4.5
There are two potential equilibria, at s∗1, where the healthy rich are in the public
sector, and s∗3, where all the rich are opting out. If and only if q
G[1]
r
(s∗3) ≥ qGsr(s∗1),
then s∗3 is Pareto dominating s
∗
1.
If only the sick rich are in the private sector, the maximization program of the
government is as follows
maxsq
G(s)
s.t. qG(s) ≤ qG
sr
(s)
qG(s) ≤ qGh r(s)
Because of lemma 2.4.2 (MAQ increases with s) and the fact that qGhr(s) de-
creases linearly with the subsidy s, qG
sr
(s) and qGhr(s) have a single crossing point,
(s, qG(s)). The maximum attainable qG is the crossing point.
If all the rich (healthy and sick) are in the private sector, the maximization
program of the government is as follows
maxsq
G(s)
s.t. qG(s) ≤ qG[1]
hr
(s)
qG(s) ≤ qGp (s)
Because of lemma 2.4.4 (MAQ increases with s) and the fact that qGp (s) de-
creases linearly with the subsidy s, qG[1]
hr
(s) and qGp (s) have a single crossing point,
(s, qG(s)). The maximum attainable qG is the crossing point.
Poor are getting utility associated with public quality. The pivotal agents
(healthy rich when they are getting private care, sick rich when healthy rich are
getting public care) are getting the exact same utility out of the public and the
private sector quality (indifference conditions). Sick rich are better off when subsi-
dized (through risk pooling) by the healthy rich. Therefore, if qG[1]
r
(s∗3) > q
G
sr
(s∗1),
an equilibrium where the healthy rich are subsidizing the sick rich, at subsidy s∗3, is
Pareto dominant.
Lemma 2.4.6
Under risk selection with assymetric information, the sick rich are getting their first-
best level of quality, q∗r at a fair premium P (qsr) = θs(q
∗
r − s). The healthy rich are
getting quality qhr(s) at a fair premium P (qhr) = θh(qhr(s) − s). The decrease in
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quality incurred by the healthy rich to signal themselves as good risks is reduced by
the subsidy.
At quality level qhr(s) and fair premium P (qhr(s)) = θh(qhr(s) − s) (in the
private sector), we have the following incentive compatibility constraints
vsr(qhr(s))− θh(qhr(s)− s) ≤ vsr(q∗r)− θs(q∗r − s)
vhr(q
∗
r)− θs(q∗r) ≤ vsr(qhr(s))− θh(qhr(s)− s)
Healthy rich are buying the contract (qhr(s), P (qhr(s))), and are not interested
in (q∗, θs(q∗ − s)).
Sick rich are not interested in (qhr(s), P (qhr(s))) if their optimal contract
(q∗, θs(q∗ − s)) is available. Because of competition in contracts, a pooling con-
tract cannot be a stable equilibrium.
qhr(s) is implicitly defined by
F 6(qhr, s) = vsr(qhr)− θh(qhr − s)− vsr(q∗r) + θs(q∗r − s) = 0
The implicit function theorem and the assumptions that
∂vij(q)
∂q
> 0 and
∂2vij(q)
∂q2
<
0 together with θh < θs imply that
∂qhr(s)
∂s
=
−∂F 6(qhr,s)
∂s
∂F 6(qhr,s)
∂qhr
=
−(θh − θs)
vsr(qhr(s))
′ + θh
> 0
∂2qGhr(s)
∂s2
= (θh − θs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
[vsr(qhr(s))
′ + θh]−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
vsr(qhr(s))
′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0
Lemma 2.4.7
Under risk selection with assymetric information, the minimum acceptable quality
in the public sector for the healthy rich is increasing with s at an increasing rate,
∂qG
hr
(s)
∂s
> 0. Healthy rich are pivotal, qG
sr
(s) > qG
hr
(s)
qG
hr
(s) is implicitly defined by
F 7(qG
hr
, s) = vhr(q
G
hr
)− vhr(qhr(s)) + θh(qhr(s)− s) = 0
The implicit function theorem and the assumptions that
∂vij(q)
∂q
> 0 and
∂2vij(q)
∂q2
<
0, together with Lemma 2.4.6 imply that
∂qG
hr
(s)
∂s
=
−∂F 7(qGhr,s)
∂s
∂F 7(qG
hr
,s)
∂qG
hr
=
(vhr(qhr(s))
′ − θh)∂qhr(s)∂s + θh
vhr(qGhr(s))
′ > 0
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From Lemma 2.3.3, qG
sr
= qG
hr
where qG
hr
is defined in the perfect information
(baseline) setting, implicitly from F 1(qG
hr
, s) = vhr(q
G
hr
) − vhr(q∗r) + θh(q∗ − s) = 0.
Because vhr(q
∗
r)− θh(q∗ − s) > vhr(qhr(s))− θh(qhr(s)− s), and because ∂vij(q)∂q > 0,
we have qG
sr
(s) > qG
hr
(s).
Proposition 2.4.8
There are two potential equilibrium, at s∗1, where the healthy rich are in the public
sector, and s∗2, where all the rich are opting out. If and only if q
G
hr
(s∗2) ≥ qGsr(s∗1),
then s∗2, where the healthy rich are participating in the private market, is Pareto
dominating s∗1, where the healthy rich are receiving public care.
If only the sick rich are in the private sector, the maximization program of the
government is as follows
maxsq
G(s)
s.t. qG(s) ≤ qG
sr
(s)
qG(s) ≤ qGh r(s)
Because of lemma 2.4.2 (MAQ increases with s) and the fact that qGh r(s)
decreases linearly with the subsidy s, qG
sr
(s) and qGh r(s) have a single crossing point,
s, qG(s). The maximum attainable qG is the crossing point.
If all the rich (healthy and sick) are in the private sector, the maximization
program of the government is as follows
maxsq
G(s)
s.t. qG(s) < qG
hr
(s)
qG(s) < qGp (s)
Because of lemma 2.4.7 (MAQ increases with s) and the fact that qGp (s) de-
creases linearly with the subsidy s, qG
hr
(s) and qGp (s) have a single crossing point,
s, qG(s). The maximum attainable qG is the crossing point.
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Chapter 3
Sex, drugs and rock’n roll: The
effect of education on health
behavior
3.1 Introduction
The high correlation between education and health has been largely documented.
Nonetheless, a causal effect of education on health has been harder to prove. The
relationship between education and mortality has been studied in the United States
by Lleras-Muney (2005) [26], in France by Albouy and Lequien (2008)[2], in the
Netherlands by van Kippersluis et al. (2009) [35], in the United Kingdom by Clark
and Royer (2008) [15]. Lleras-Muney and Kippersluis et al. claim to have found that
education delays mortality in a significant manner while Alvouy and Clark do not.
This may be due to the different interactions of education with the national health
system in each country and the specific educational improvements of the reform.
Education may directly or indirectly affect health outcomes. A direct effect
would be through health behavior. Better educated people have greater means to
evaluate risk and make the necessary changes in their lifestyle. The indirect channel
is through income. Wealthier people can afford more and better services that have a
positive impact on health. For instance, richer individuals can afford better health
care; especially in health care systems largely financed by out of pocket expenditure.
Educational reforms have proved to be good instruments to test the causal
impact of education on several outcomes. In labor economics, educational reforms
have been traditionally used to measure the effect of education on workers’ wages.
In health economics those reforms have been used mainly to measure the impact
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on health outcomes. The educational reforms are considered exogenous, pushing a
large part of the population to extend their life school years. In the health economics
literature, most of the reforms that have been used as instruments were implemented
during the first half of the twentieth century while the observed effects are measured
in general more than 50 years later. This allows testing the consequences of educa-
tion on late health outcomes but it is affected by survival bias, as those who were
not healthy enough to live up to certain age are not in the sample. The estimated
effect of education can be considered as a lower bound if the effect of education is
assumed to be the same among all health groups.
In contrast with previous studies, I use a much more recent educational reform,
namely the one that took place in Mexico in 1993, which extended the compulsory
school years from six to nine. Data were collected a in subsequent survey in 2005;
this is nine years after the reform was implemented. This fact allows shedding
some light on the causal effect of education on health behavior (sexual behavior and
tobacco use) during adolescence.. Those estimations are not affected by survival
bias, given the negligible mortality rate of young people.
This paper is organized as follows: in section two I start with a discussion
on the effect of education on health outcomes. Then, section three introduces the
Mexican educative system and its developments, putting special emphasis on the
1993 Educational Reform. Section four describes the two data sets. Section five
presents the methodology and the estimations. Finally in section six I discuss the
findings.
3.2 Education and health
The first challenge to study the relationship between education and health comes
from properly defining what we understand for health. Health is a broad concept;
it is not a one dimensional variable. Basically, we can distinguish three categories:
self assesed health, health outcomes and health behavior. Self assesed health incor-
porates several aspects of health but is a subjective measure. Health outcomes and
health behavior are much more robust in terms of objectivity but more difficult to
integrate in a single index. Health outcomes are concrete states of health that are
influenced by health behavior and access to health care.
One of the earliest contributions to study the causal relationship between
schooling and health comes from Berger and Leigh (1989)[7]. They use the Ex-
amination Survey I and the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men in the
USA to study the impact of education on blood pressure and activity limitations.
Education is instrumented as a per-capita state expenditure on education. They
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find a significant positive causal effect of education on reducing high blood pressure
and activity limitations.
Adams (2002)[1], using a sample of over 24,000 observations from the Health
and Retirement Study in the USA, studies several kinds of activity limitations for in-
dividuals between 51 and 60 years old. His estimations are instrumented by changes
on compulsory schooling laws and people’s date of birth. He also finds a positive
causal effect of education in the reduction of most ot the activity limitations that
he considers.
Doyle et al (2005) [16] inquire on the effect of parents’ education on their
childrens’ health in the United Kingdom. They also use changes on compulsory
education laws as an instrument for education. They do not identify a positive
effect of education on children’s health. Arendt (2005) [3] looks at self reported
health and chronic health conditions as health measures and uses the 1958 and 1975
educational reforms. He cannot identify a causal effect of education on those health
measures.
More recent studies have analyzed the causal effect of education on mortality.
Albouy & Leqien 2009 [2] and van Kippersluis et al. 2009 [35] are the two most
recent studies that have used individual data rather than cohort size which provides
a more robust result. Despite using similar methodology their conclusions are on
the opposite direction. Albouy & Lequien 2009 do not find a significant decrease in
mortality for adults between 50 and 80 years old in France while van Kippersluis
et al. 2009 do find a causal effect of education on reducing mortality risk on males
between 80 to 88 years old in the Netherlands.
One of the disadvantages of using mortality to analyze the effect of education
on health is that it may be sensitive to survival bias. Further, there is huge time span
between the given treatment and observed outcome. So, if we want to analyze an
immediate impact of education on health, mortality is not a good candidate. Health
behavior can be a more sensitive measure. Medical studies have shown that health
outcomes are highly influenced by health behavior. To analyze this relationship, I
am using health behavior to measure the effect right after the given treatment. This
analysis considers one additional education after the 6th year of primary school as
a treatment. The two aspects in health behavior I am measuring is sexual behavior
and smoking during adolescence.
Education may be seen as an amount of information that it is transmitted to
individuals so testing the causal effect of education on health behavior is similar to
test individual reaction to information on the adoption of healthy life style. If there
is a causal effect of education on health behavior then informative campaigns about
the benefits of a healthy life style should be highlighted. On the contrary, if there is
no causal effect, then there would be a greater need to rely on alternatives policies
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to influence health behavior through higher taxes on cigarettes and smoking bans.
3.2.1 Sexual Behavior
Risky sexual behavior during adolescence can lead to venereal diseases and teen
pregnancy which may damage psychological and physical development of the indi-
vidual. Latin America and the Caribbean region reports very high rates of teen
pregnancy even though current total fertility rate is at 2.21 which is very close to
replacement level. Countries such as Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica report more than
60 life births per 1000 women aged 15-19. This is a figure is 8 times greater than in
Western Europe. Mexico teen fertility rate is at 65 life births per 1000 women aged
15-19, which is not very different from the regional average at 73.
In Mexico, one in six life births take place on women younger than 20 years
old. Teen pregnancy imposes a great social and economic cost, not only for the
young parents but also in the new born child. There exists a strong correlation
between mother aged below 20 years at first birth (MAFB-20) and child poor school
performance; between MAFB-20 and adolescent criminality. Although this is simply
a correlation there are some elements that make us suspicious that this relationship
could be at least partially causal.
A better understanding of the impact of education on sexual behavior can
shed light on the complexity behind teen pregnancy. For instance, if education does
not have a causal effect on sexual behavior, then it would be worth to concentrate
more resources in campaigns directed to parents to prevent teen pregnancies. In
contrast, if education has a causal effect on sexual behavior then programs targeted
to adolescents may prove to be more cost effective.
3.2.2 Tobacco use
Adolescent smoking is particularly interesting as a health risk behavior. It is highly
addictive which makes that those who start smoking at early age remain smokers
for a long period of time. Tobacco is considered as a gateway to other drugs. This
means that adolescent smokers are more likely to begin drinking alcohol and using
illicit drugs than non-smoking adolescents.
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3.3 The Mexican Educational System and its 1993
Reform
The Mexican educative system is organized as follows: Primary school comprehends
the first six years of formal education (from six to 12 years old) and is followed by
three years of secondary school (12-15). Then, before entering university, students
follow three more years of preparatory school (15-18).
Although the first compulsory schooling law in Mexico was implemented as
early as in 1867, it took around 80 years to have a first Census (1950) showing
that more than 50 percent of the Mexican population was literate. Until 1920, the
scarce existing schools were mainly concentrated in a few cities in a country with
an overwhelming rural population at that time. With the creation of the Ministry
of Public Education in 1921 and the beginning of a long lasting peaceful period, the
basic education network improved significantly. At the same time, a very drastic
demographic transition started, with record high population growth rates from the
1950s to the mid 1970s. This made the coverage of the increasing demand for
education more difficult. However, the percentage of the population from 6 to 24
years old attending to school grew from 27.73 to 48.17 per cent from 1950 to 19701.
In the 1960s primary education was widely available nationwide with a rel-
atively high enrollment rate. On the other hand, secondary education enrollment
rate was much lower and it was mainly confined to urban areas. A large part of
the 6th grade primary students did not continue with secondary education. In or-
der to cope with a lack of infrastructure, in 1969 a tele-secondary school system
was introduced in rural areas. This system consisted of an instructor supported by
audiovisual material aired on national television channels.
A significant milestone in the secondary school system was reached by the
Minister of Education in 1974, known as the Chetumal Resolution. This resolution
set the curricular secondary education program that was valid until 1993 and aimed
to encourage students to continue their education after conclusion of primary school.
In 1977 there was a first attempt to introduce a mandatory secondary school law.
The initiative failed to be approved by the Congress in a debate that judged the
initiative as unrealistic or too early to be applied. In the 1980s the Mexican economy
suffered from two major economic crises (1982 and 1986) which made it impossible
to retake the 1977 initiative.
In the early 1990s the economy stabilized and more credible democratic insti-
tutions emerged. Also the state budget was in good shape since there were funds
generated from a privatization process of several state firms. Those three factors
1Administrative data, Secretaria de Educacion Publica.
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created a favorable environment for the 1993 educative reform to prosper, making
secondary education mandatory and increasing the secondary education infrastruc-
ture to meet the new demand.
The reform was approved in March 1993 and published the official journal in
June the same year. It took real effect on students who were 12 year old or younger
in September 1993. The number of students attending secondary school stagnated
at around 4.2 million from 1989-90 to 1992-93 school years and exceeded 4.8 million
in the fourth year after the reform 1996-97. This is an increase of over 3 percent per
year in a segment of the population which was growing below 0.5 percent.
The reform benefited from the agreement of different political actors like the
teachers’ union and the opposition parties. Education Minister at that time, Mr.
Ernesto Zedillo, was largely credited for the reform and next year he became the
presidential candidate for the ruling party, winning the general elections in 1994.
3.4 Data
The National Youth Survey (ENJUV 2005) in Mexico is a longitudinal dataset with
observations on 12,796 individuals aged 12 to 29 years. The survey was carried out
by the Mexican Institute of Youth in cooperation with the National Autonomous
University of Mexico and the Ministry of Public Education in October 2005.
From the 12,796 individuals captured in the survey I take a subsample of those
who were born between 1977 and 1984. Figure 3.1 shows the dropout rate at the
end of primary school by birth cohort (1977 to 1984). It can be seen a discontinuous
drop between the 1980 and 1981 cohorts which it is presumed to be the effect of the
1993 reform.
The aim of ENJUV 2005 was to provide information about education, health,
sexuality, private life attitudes and values of the teenagers and young adults through
a questionnaire of more than 200 questions divided in 9 sections. A key question was
condom use during the first sexual intercourse (FSI) and the age of the FSI. These
two variables allow us to construct a group of dependent variables that describe
sexual behavior.
The variables that are built from those questions are: No sex valued one if
the individual did not have a sexual intercourse during the age of 15 to 19 and
zero otherwise; Sex without condom valued one if the individual had a FSI without
condom use. The reason to focus on the FSI is that there is a very high rate of no
condom use during the FSI. It can be observed that, as teenagers gain more sexual
experience, the likelihood of using contraceptive measures increases. Also looking
to a simple descriptive data of ENJUV 2005 we find out that among individuals
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Figure 3.1: Effect of the 1993 Reform on the drop rate
who started their active sexual life between 15-19,those who reported condom use
in their FSI had 75 per cent less chances to become parent during adolescence.
The other relevant question is the age at which they started smoking if ever
smoked. From this question I construct the dependent variable smoke which is
valued one if the individual reported to have started smoking between 14 and 19
years old.
The explanatory variable that is of main interest for this paper is education
and this is captured through the variable Dropping after PS. This variable is valued
one if the individual stoped studying after the sixth school year (primary school) and
zero if he/she continued. Note that only individuals who finished the sixth grade of
school are taken into consideration (in the sample). The reason is that the reform
that serves as an instrument affects theose individuals who may drop out after com-
pleting primary school and not in those who already left school before. Additionally,
education is measured as a dichotomous variable , to avoid potential reverse causal-
ity in case that becoming parents influences the decision to stop schooling. This way
we make sure that we first give the treatment and then we observe the behavior.
The rest of the control variables are: demographics, female and indigenous,
socioeconomic index (which may be low, middle and high), Family problems (which
is valued one if the individual grew up with a single parent or faced alcohol abuse
from one of his parents) and social clusters which tend to control for social networks
which may influence health behavior. The two social clusters are self identification
as religious person and declared to prefer rock music (top two music type). Finally
there is a group of variables that classify the place of residence. The variableBig
city refers to the individual living in Mexico City, Guadalajara or Monterrey, the
three largest metropolitan areas.
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Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the descriptive statistics of sexual behavior and tobacco
use. The number of observations is not exactly the same in both tables because there
are a few respondents that did not completely answer one section but did to the
other. For sexual behavior individuals who had a FSI at 14 years old or younger are
excluded from this sample in the same manner that individuals who start smoking
before 14 years old are excluded from the tobacco sample. This is because if they
have already changed their behavior before the treatment then we cannot expect
any effect from it.
3.5 Estimation
There are two separate analysis of health behavior during adolescence in this paper.
First, I discuss the effect of education on sexual risk behavior and then, in a separate
subsection, the impact of education on smoking. By using ENJUV 2005 data it is
possible to identify the effect of the 1993 educational reform on a sample of men
and women and on a subsample of women only.
The main danger on adolescents’ sexual behavior is having an unprotected sex,
representing a high risk for sexual transmissible diseases and unwanted pregnancies.
ENJUV 2005 does not dispose information on ever having an unprotected sexual
intercourse during adolescence. The survey has data on whether or not individuals
report condom use during their FSI and how old they were, if they ever had sex.
Based on this information there are three possible outcomes. First, the respondent
did not have a sexual intercourse during adolescence. Second, the respondent did
have sex but his/her FSI was with condom use. Third, the respondent did have
sex and did not report condom use in his/her FSI. If the individual used condom
during the FSI it is very likely that he/she does the same in his/her subsequent
sexual engagements. Nevertheless, it cannot be regarded as zero risk of having
unprotected sex during adolescence if they use condom in the FSI.
I use the 1993 reform as an instrument to control for unobserved characteristics
that may bias the estimators. First, I will present OLS and Probit estimations for
no sex, sex without condom use independently, then I estimate the probability of sex
without condom use conditional on having sex. Second, I show the causal effect of
education for each equation with IV and biprobit estimation procedures. Although,
it could be appropriate to try also more sophisticated estimation strategies yet as
the sample size is not big enough I have to rely on the standard estimation methods.
In the tobacco analysis I follow the same logic. First I show the non causal
relationship then I use the reform to analyze the causal effect.
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3.5.1 Correlation between health behavior and education
Sexual behavior
Tables 3.4 to 3.6 show the non causal relationship between sexual behavior and
the covariates for men and women combined. In each table the first column shows
the OLS linear probability model estimation; the second column shows the Probit
estimation and the third column shows the Probit marginal effect. We can observe
that there are no contradicting signs and the Probit marginal effect is close to the
OLS estimation. Table 3.7 shows a similar analysis only for a subsample of women.
The most risky sexual behavior for an adolescent is having started sexual live
without condom use. Table 3.5 shows the unconditional probability of having a FSI
during adolescence (15-19 yrs old) without condom use. Dropping school between
the 6th and 7th grade significantly (p < 0.01) increases the risk of having FSI
without condom use adding 7.7 percentage points to the base probability. Again,
this is not a causal effect but this correlation is not negligible.
The other covariates that are statistically significant on the equation of having
a FSI without condom use are female, middle, high socioeconomic index, rock music,
urban and Center West region. For women the probability of having a FSI without
condom use is (p < 0.01) 19 percentage points higher than men. Adolescents from
more favorable socioeconomic households have lower risk. Middle (p < 0.1) and high
(p < 0.01) socioeconomic index have 5 and 15 percentage points lower probability
than low socioeconomic households of having a FSI without condom use. Rock
music lovers have lower risk, (p < 0.1). As expected, urban areas have a lower
risk (8.4 percentage points less, p < 0.01) than the rural one. The most relevant
geographical difference is the Center West residents, having 9.8 percentage points
less on the probability (p < 0.01) than those of the South.
Table 3.4 shows the probability of having sex versus not having sex. Dropping
school at the end of primary school is estimated to reduce the probability of not
having sex by 3 percentage points but it is not statistically significant from zero.
Positive and statistically significant covariates of not having sex during adoles-
cence are: female with 16.4 percentage points less to the base probability (p < 0.01),
indigenous with 9.5 percentage points (p < 0.05), high socioeconomic index with 7
percentage points (p < 0.05), religious with 4 percentage points (p < 0.05) and
living on the Center West region, which is well known to be the most conservative
region of the country, 5.7 percentage points (vs South region base).. In contrast,
urban residence and family problems reduce the probability of not having sex in
about 6.6 and 5.6 per cent respectively in a significant manner (p < 0.01). All these
signs are as expected, except for indigenous.
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Table 3.6 shows the probability of having sex without condom conditional on
having sex. Dropping school at the end of primary school increases the probability
of having sex without condom by 11 percentage points (p < 0.01) conditional on
having sex.
The other covariates which are statically significant are female, which increases
the probability by 20 percentage points (p < 0.01). Middle and high SI, rock music,
urban and Center West region decrease the probability between 5 and 16 percent
and are statistically significant.
In summary, from tables 3.4 to 3.6 we can conclude that passing from the sixth
to the seventh grade has a favorable effect on condom use if having a sexual active
life during adolescence. There is not statistically significant evidence that there is
an increased sexual activity during adolescence due to education. Moreover looking
at the unconditional probability of having sex without condom use education sig-
nificantly reduces this risk. Table 3.7 shows the same analysis only for the women’s
sample with a very similar pattern except for the intercept. The effect of education
goes in the same direction for both samples.
Tobacco
Table 3.13 presents the probability of start smoking between 14 to 19 years old. For
both groups men and women combined and women only, education is significant (p <
0.01) and positively correlated with smoking. This may sound a bit counterintuitive
if we think that better educated people may be more aware of the damage caused
by smoking. Dropping out of school at the sixth grade reduces the probability of
smoking by 6 to 7 percent. Nevertheless, peer pressure or some unobservable factors
may be driving this result.
Other covariates that positively and significantly increase the propensity to
smoke are family problems, rock music, urban, big city and Central region. Females
had a significantly (p < 0.01) lower propensity to smoke than males.
3.5.2 Causal effect of education on health behavior
The effect of the educational reform is statistically significant, validating its use as
an instrument for the estimations. The F-test for a valid instrument passes the
criteria proposed by Stock and Yogo 2002. Nevertheless, as expected, the standard
errors in the IV estimation are bigger so I focus more on the sign rather than on the
magnitude. In fact, some effects are too big but if we consider a 10 percent lower
bound, the effect may be reasonable. The magnitude of the effect may be due to
the imprecision of high standard errors.
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Sexual behavior
The main results of the causal effect of education on sexual behavior are summarized
on table 3.9 corresponding IV estimation method. The first column shows the
estimation of not having sex, the second column shows the unconditional probability
of having sex without condom use and the third column shows the probability of
having sex without condom conditional on having sex. Additionally, table 3.10
shows a bivariate Probit estimation method which presents very similar result s
to the IV estimation. The coefficients need to be converted into marginal effects
to be comparable. Table 3.12 and 3.11 present also a IV estimation, the first one
considering just the cohorts of 1979-1982 and the second one for the cohorts of 1977-
1984 but correcting for a time trend. In fact, the estimations are also similar to the
IV but due to bigger standard errors the coefficients are statistically less significant.
Table 3.8 shows a similar analysis only for a subsample of women but coefficients
are not statistically significant.
From 3.9 we conclude that dropping out of school has a significant and positive
impact on not having sex during adolescence (p < 0.1) which may suggest that peer
pressure has some impact on sexual behavior. Most of the covariates have the
same sign than in the no causal estimation but significant levels are much lower.
Female, indigenous, family problems, religious, urban and Center West region are
still significant with the same signs than before.
The causal estimation of the effect of education on the probability of having
a FSI without condom use is described in table 3.9, column two. Education has a
protective effect to reduce the risk of having a sexual intercourse without condom use
(p < 0.01). The covariates that are statistically significant are female, indigenous,
family problems and Center West region.
The third column in table 3.9 shows the probability of condom use conditional
on having a FSI. Dropping school between the sixth and seventh grade substantially
reduces the risk of not using condom (p < 0.05) during the FSI conditional on having
sex. The other significant covariates are female, with a positive contribution, and
indigenous, urban residence and Center West region has a negative contribution.
Tobacco
Table 3.14 describes the IV estimation for tobacco use during adolescence. In the
first column we observe that tobacco use is no longer significantly different from zero.
The rest of covariates that were significant in table 3.13 are still significant and have
the same sign in the first column of table 3.14 , which comprehends the sample
of both men and women. In contrast, for the women only subsample, dropping
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after primary school still has a negative and significant impact on the probability of
starting smoking during adolescence.
This result is very interesting; even though women have a lower probability to
smoke overall, education has the opposite effect that I would expect. One possible
interpretation is that education is effective in fighting prejudices between men and
women. For low educated people, a woman smoking may be considered much worse
than men smoking. For more educated people, smoking is bad but a woman smoking
is not regarded much worse than a man smoking.
3.6 Discussion
There is evidence that education has an impact on health behavior although the
effects are not always in the expected direction. The estimated effect of education is
also influenced by adolescent’s peer pressure. We could expect the effect of education
on health behavior would more positive later in life.
For sexual health behavior the net effect of education is encouraging. Contin-
uing studying from the sixth to the seventh grade significantly decreases the risk
of having a FSI without condom use. Nevertheless, education also has a positive
effect on initiating sexual life during adolescence. It is not clear if the increase of
sexual activity is due to the exposure to sexual information at school or due to the
concentration of young people. However the high sexual activity effect is overcome
with a much higher probability of condom use if the adolescent has sex.
The socioeconomic index seems not to play a very important role once the
causal effect of education on sexual behavior is controlled. Family problems, instead,
increase significantly the probability of having sex without condom use. Social
clusters do not play a determinant role once it has been controlled for the causal
effect of education. Urban residence increases the probability of having sex but
urban residents also report a higher condom use though the net effect cancels out.
The significant and positive correlation between smoking and education dis-
appears once we control for the causal effect of education for the women and men
group combined. Nevertheless for women only group we find a causal effect of edu-
cation on smoking. This is not the first time in the literature that effect of education
on women smoking is positive, previous studies have found at least this correlation
especially in middle income countries. This may be interpreted as having fewer
prejudices against sex stigma ”women cannot do everything men can do”. We ob-
serve that for more educated people in Mexico the female-male gap in smoking rate
is reduced with education but mainly because women have a higher smoking rate.
Nevertheless women smoking rate is much lower than men even for educated folks.
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I have to precise that the variable ever smoke is quite broad and it would
be interesting to look also to other measures like daily smoking since this has a
stronger correlation with risky health behavior. We may think that educated people
are aware that becoming a regular smoker represents a hazard for their health but
just trying does not make them addict. However it is interesting to see that the
advantage of having more information is offset by other effects surrounding young
people.
There are two main limitations in this study. First, given that the number
of observations for the cohort of interest is relatively small, the estimation suffers
from big standard errors which make the estimation imprecise. Nevertheless, some
effects are significant. The second limitation comes from the fact that data come
from a survey and given the existence of some taboos, individuals might not be truly
reporting their behavior.
Measuring the impact of education on health behavior shed light on people’s
reaction given a better understanding of health risks. This is relevant for policy
makers aiming to induce healthier behaviors. Based on the results of this paper I
would make different recommendations with respect to health risk. For instance, a
better understanding of the health risk makes clear improvements in sexual behavior.
In contrast, smoking shows a different scenario especially for women. The advantage
of having more information about health risk is easily overcome by other factors,
like peer pressure in secondary schools. For this reason, in order to discourage
adolescent smoking I would rely more heavily on higher taxes and smoking bans in
public places.
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3.7 Appendix
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for sexual behavior
Reform
No Yes Total
N 1617 1837 3454
Variable
Sexual behavior
No sex 0.4634 0.4925 0.4789
Sex without condom 0.354 0.3092 0.3302
Sex with condom 0.1826 0.1982 0.1909
Education
Dropping after PS 0.1575 0.0764 0.1144
Demographics
Female 0.6454 0.6185 0.6311
Age 26.4585 22.4409 24.3217
Indigenous 0.0422 0.0336 0.0376
S. economic index
Middle 0.5985 0.6113 0.6053
High 0.1101 0.1229 0.1169
Family background
F. Problems 0.3092 0.3092 0.3092
Social cluster
Religious 0.3243 0.3464 0.3361
Rock music 0.1661 0.2246 0.1972
Residence
Urban 0.7053 0.7269 0.7168
Big City 0.3349 0.3645 0.3506
Center 0.1608 0.1791 0.1706
North East 0.2736 0.2334 0.2522
North West 0.0389 0.0454 0.0424
Center West 0.3421 0.3521 0.3474
South, Sout Est 0.1846 0.19 0.1875
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for tobbaco use
Reform
No Yes Total
N 1839 1630 3469
Variable
Health behavior
Smocking 0.2892 0.3121 0.3013
Education
Dropping after PS 0.1576 0.077 0.1149
Demographics
Female 0.6493 0.6241 0.6359
Age 26.4583 22.4407 24.3215
Indigenous 0.0428 0.0337 0.038
S. economic index
Middle 0.5972 0.6099 0.6039
High 0.1102 0.1228 0.1169
Family background
F. Problems 0.3053 0.3084 0.3069
Social cluster
Religious 0.3246 0.3469 0.3364
Rock music 0.1643 0.2246 0.1963
Residence
Urban 0.7034 0.7254 0.7151
Big City 0.3353 0.3664 0.3518
Center 0.161 0.1798 0.171
North East 0.2739 0.2325 0.252
North West 0.0381 0.0453 0.0419
Center West 0.3413 0.3506 0.3462
South, Sout Est 0.1857 0.1919 0.189
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Table 3.3: OLS Regression for dropping after primary school N=3454
Coefficient t Coefficient t
Reform -0.0702512 (-6.88) -0.0673304 (-3.14)
Demographics
Age - - 0.0006931 (0.15)
Female 0.0401523 (3.78) 0.0401702 (3.79)
Indigenous 0.116935 (4.12) 0.1168988 (4.11)
S. economic index
Middle -0.1476951 (-11.84) -0.1477471 (-11.84)
High -0.1844808 (-9.68) -0.1845241 (-9.68)
Family background
F. Problems 0.0239832 (2.17) 0.0239708 (0.98)
Social cluster
Religious 0.001288 (0.12) 0.0012274 (0.11)
Rock music -0.0476129 (-3.64) -0.047542 (-3.63)
Residence
Urban -0.0342493 (-2.66) -0.0341769 (-2.65)
Big City -0.0401839 (-2.87) -0.040146 (-2.87)
Center -0.0107535 (-0.55) -0.0107529 (-0.55)
North East -0.0069529 (-0.41) -0.0070345 (-0.42)
North West -0.0189438 (-0.69) -0.0188732 (-0.68)
Center West 0.0156049 (0.99) 0.0155663 (0.98)
Constant 0.272134 (13.59) 0.253659 -2.1
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Table 3.4: Probability of having not sex during N=3454
OLS Probit Mfx probit
Education
Dropping after PS -0.0288[0.0283] -0.0733[0.0728] -0.0292[0.0289]
Demographics
Female 0.1619[0.0175]*** 0.4163[0.0458]*** 0.1639[0.0177]***
Indigenous 0.0926[0.0476]* 0.2384[0.1227]* 0.0947[0.0482]**
S. economic index
Middle 0.0268[0.021] 0.0688[0.0545] 0.0274[0.0217]
High 0.0756[0.0316]** 0.1955[0.0822]** 0.0779[0.0326]**
Family background
F. Problems -0.0546[0.0182]*** -0.1422[0.0474]*** -0.0565[0.0188]***
Social cluster
Religious 0.0419[0.0181]** 0.1079[0.0465]** 0.043[0.0185]**
Rock music 0.0181[0.0217] 0.048[0.0563] 0.0191[0.0225]
Residence
Urban -0.0643[0.0216]*** -0.1656[0.0555]*** -0.066[0.0221]***
Big City -0.0073[0.0231] -0.0199[0.0598] -0.0079[0.0238]
Center -0.0423[0.0323] -0.1101[0.0839] -0.0437[0.0332]
North East -0.0154[0.0282] -0.0385[0.0724] -0.0153[0.0288]
North West 0.0128[0.0462] 0.0339[0.1186] 0.0135[0.0473]
Center West 0.0573[0.0262]** 0.149[0.0674]** 0.0594[0.0268]**
Constant 0.3909[0.0322]*** -0.2817[0.0836]***
Standard errors in [] Significance level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: Probability of having sex without condom (FSI) N=3454
OLS Probit Mfx probit
Education
Dropping after PS 0.0767[0.028]*** 0.2049[0.0733]*** 0.0761[0.028]***
Demographics
Female 0.01[0.0166] 0.0288[0.0472] 0.0104[0.0169]
Indigenous -0.0799[0.0445]* -0.2245[0.1266]* -0.0766[0.0406]*
S. economic index
Middle -0.0439[0.0207]** -0.1222[0.0561]** -0.0443[0.0204]**
High -0.1302[0.0292]*** -0.3808[0.0876]*** -0.1266[0.0264]***
Family background
F. Problems 0.0506[0.0177]*** 0.1399[0.0485]*** 0.051[0.0178]***
Social cluster
Religious -0.0229[0.0172] -0.0632[0.0484] -0.0226[0.0173]
Rock music -0.0457[0.02]** -0.1303[0.059]** -0.046[0.0204]**
Residence
Urban 0.0095[0.0206] 0.0254[0.057] 0.0091[0.0204]
Big City -0.0046[0.0216] -0.0149[0.0618] -0.0054[0.0222]
Center -0.0065[0.0313] -0.0117[0.0863] -0.0042[0.031]
North East 0.0373[0.0273] 0.1046[0.0737] 0.0381[0.0271]
North West 0.001[0.0433] 0.0003[0.1196] 0.0001[0.0431]
Center West -0.0793[0.0253]*** -0.2256[0.07]*** -0.0798[0.0244]***
Constant 0.3741[0.0319]*** -0.321[0.0865]***
Standard errors in [] Significance level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: Probability of having sex without condom (FSI), conditional on having
sex N=1797
OLS Probit Mfx probit
Education
Dropping after PS 0.108[0.0324]*** 0.3638[0.1164]*** 0.127[0.0373]***
Demographics
Female 0.1927[0.023]*** 0.531[0.0633]*** 0.1981[0.0233]***
Indigenous -0.064[0.0644] -0.1991[0.1948] -0.0764[0.0764]
S. economic index
Middle -0.05[0.0261]* -0.1379[0.0773]* -0.0511[0.0284]*
High -0.1524[0.0429]*** -0.4068[0.118]*** -0.1577[0.0466]***
Family background
F. Problems 0.0287[0.023] 0.0861[0.0669] 0.0319[0.0247]
Social cluster
Religious 0.0123[0.0237] 0.0373[0.069] 0.0139[0.0256]
Rock music -0.0572[0.0294]* -0.1566[0.0784]** -0.0593[0.0301]**
Residence
Urban -0.0744[0.0272]*** -0.232[0.084]*** -0.0844[0.0297]***
Big City -0.0179[0.0306] -0.0498[0.0852] -0.0186[0.0319]
Center -0.0675[0.0418] -0.1863[0.1217] -0.0707[0.0469]
North East 0.0296[0.0349] 0.0842[0.1077] 0.0311[0.0395]
North West -0.0224[0.0588] -0.0662[0.1738] -0.0249[0.0661]
Center West -0.0924[0.0338]*** -0.2593[0.1015]** -0.098[0.0387]**
Constant 0.6589[0.0412]*** 0.4511[0.124]***
Standard errors in [] Significance level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.7: OLS estimation for sexual behavior only women
No sex No condom[U] No condom[C]
Education
Dropping after PS -0.049[0.0328] 0.0764[0.0327]** 0.0812[0.0352]**
Demographics
Indigenous -0.064[0.0644] -0.1991[0.1948] -0.0764[0.0764]
S. economic index
Middle 0.0539[0.0265]** -0.0367[0.026] -0.0074[0.0321]
High 0.1421[0.0418]*** -0.1275[0.0383]*** -0.0734[0.0612]
Family background
F. Problems -0.0588[0.0234]** 0.0565[0.0225]** 0.0293[0.0289]
Social cluster
Religious 0.0389[0.0225]* -0.0212[0.0215] 0.0152[0.0294]
Rock music 0.0265[0.0304] -0.0432[0.028] -0.0419[0.0435]
Residence
Urban -0.0725[0.0267]*** 0.0228[0.0258] -0.0761[0.0323]**
Big City -0.0123[0.03] -0.0448[0.028] -0.1139[0.0413]***
Center -0.0553[0.0413] 0.0518[0.0395] 0.03[0.0528]
North East -0.0723[0.0353]** 0.0703[0.034]** 0.03[0.0425]
North West -0.0791[0.0585] 0.0359[0.0558] -0.0664[0.0738]
Center West 0.0521[0.0324] -0.0384[0.0311] -0.0054[0.0415]
Constant 0.5646[0.0372]*** 0.3456[0.0359]*** 0.8101[0.0469]***
Standard errors in [] Significance level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table 3.8: IV estimation for sexual behavior only women
No sex No condom[U] No condom[C]
Education
Dropping after PS -0.0811[0.2389] 0.2438[0.2285] 0.5099[0.4111]
Demographics
Indigenous 0.0304[0.0646] -0.045[0.0615] -0.1178[0.1168]
S. economic index
Middle 0.0487[0.0465] -0.0096[0.0446] 0.0687[0.0817]
High 0.1353[0.065]** -0.0922[0.0605] 0.0186[0.1089]
Family background
F. Problems -0.0578[0.0245]** 0.0513[0.0238]** 0.0142[0.0337]
Social cluster
Religious 0.0393[0.0227]* -0.0235[0.0217] 0.0093[0.0313]
Rock music 0.0244[0.0343] -0.0319[0.032] -0.0115[0.0531]
Residence
Urban -0.074[0.0289]** 0.0307[0.028] -0.0607[0.0382]
Big City -0.0135[0.0312] -0.0385[0.0293] -0.0963[0.0452]**
Center -0.0568[0.0425] 0.0594[0.0411] 0.0485[0.0586]
North East -0.0735[0.0363]** 0.0766[0.0353]** 0.0384[0.0461]
North West -0.0814[0.0606] 0.0478[0.0573] -0.0544[0.0755]
Center West 0.0517[0.0325] -0.0361[0.0315] -0.0027[0.0449]
Constant 0.5646[0.0372]*** 0.3456[0.0359]*** 0.8101[0.0469]***
Standard errors in [] Significance level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.9: IV estimation for sexual behavior men and women combined
No sex No condom[U] No condom[C]
Education
Dropping after PS -0.4567[0.2482]* 0.5259[0.2386]** 0.6847[0.3919]*
Demographics
Female 0.1797[0.0204]*** -0.0087[0.0198] 0.1609[0.0322]***
Indigenous 0.1446[0.0562]** -0.1345[0.0544]** -0.1958[0.1164]*
S. economic index
Middle -0.0371[0.0429] 0.0233[0.0416] 0.0352[0.0647]
High -0.0046[0.0561] -0.046[0.0532] -0.0503[0.082]
Family background
F. Problems -0.0443[0.0198]** 0.0398[0.0193]** 0.0107[0.0275]
Social cluster
Religious 0.0412[0.0187]** -0.0222[0.0179] 0.0136[0.0251]
Rock music -0.0048[0.0256] -0.0218[0.0241] -0.0283[0.0363]
Residence
Urban -0.0789[0.0239]*** 0.0248[0.0231] -0.0575[0.0322]*
Big City -0.0253[0.026] 0.0143[0.0245] 0.0057[0.0356]
Center -0.0462[0.0335] -0.0024[0.0328] -0.0663[0.045]
North East -0.016[0.0292] 0.0379[0.0287] 0.0247[0.0384]
North West 0.0045[0.0468] 0.0098[0.0438] -0.0356[0.0625]
Center West 0.0646[0.0277]** -0.087[0.0273]*** -0.1062[0.0383]***
Constant 0.4908[0.0661]*** 0.2692[0.0644]*** 0.5375[0.0962]***
Standard errors in [] Significance level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.10: Bivariate probit estimation for sexual behavior men and women com-
bined
No sex No condom[U] No condom[C]
Education
Dropping after PS -0.53[0.3742] 0.7408[0.3465]** 1.1984[0.3809]***
Demographics
Female 0.4124[0.0461]*** 0.028[0.0465] 0.509[0.0659]***
Indigenous 0.2344[0.1215]* -0.2191[0.1249]* -0.199[0.1843]
S. economic index
Middle 0.0677[0.054] -0.1198[0.0555]** -0.1316[0.0744]*
High 0.1927[0.0815]** -0.3754[0.0869]*** -0.3916[0.1149]***
Family background
F. Problems -0.1414[0.0469]*** 0.1385[0.0479]*** 0.0821[0.0643]
Social cluster
Religious 0.1049[0.0462]** -0.0604[0.0478] 0.0377[0.066]
Rock music 0.0449[0.0558] -0.1258[0.0584]** -0.1468[0.0762]*
Residence
Urban -0.1636[0.0549]*** 0.0257[0.0562] -0.2219[0.0817]***
Big City -0.0207[0.0592] -0.0147[0.061] -0.0501[0.0819]
Center -0.1075[0.0831] -0.012[0.0851] -0.1749[0.1189]
North East -0.035[0.0717] 0.101[0.0726] 0.0793[0.103]
North West 0.0322[0.1174] 0.0037[0.1182] -0.0567[0.1668]
Center West 0.148[0.0667]** -0.2215[0.0695]*** -0.2431[0.1021]**
Constant -0.2276[0.0955]** -0.3786[0.0935]*** 0.3354[0.1415]**
Standard errors in [] Significance level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.11: IV estimation with cohort trend for sexual behavior men and women
combined
No sex No condom[U] No condom[C]
Education
Dropping after PS -0.2403[0.4711] 0.4573[0.4633] 0.65145[0.3842]*
Demographics
Female 0.1512[0.0261]*** -0.0058[0.0256] 0.1261[0.0509]**
Indigenous 0.0633[0.0745] -0.1265[0.0699]* -0.3318[0.2008]*
S. economic index
Middle 0.0664[0.0728] 0.0131[0.0725] 0.1274[0.1179]
High 0.1244[0.0927] -0.0587[0.091] 0.0588[0.1423]
Family background
F. Problems -0.0609[0.0217]*** 0.0414[0.0213]* -0.0087[0.0377]
Social cluster
Religious 0.0414[0.0182]** -0.0222[0.0177] 0.0148[0.0299]
Rock music 0.027[0.0312] -0.0249[0.03] -0.0011[0.0479]
Residence
Urban -0.0563[0.0268]** 0.0226[0.0263] -0.0393[0.044]
Big City 0.0028[0.0301] 0.0116[0.0288] 0.0291[0.0462]
Center -0.0395[0.0329] -0.0031[0.0328] -0.065[0.0534]
North East -0.0098[0.0286] 0.0373[0.0287] 0.0237[0.0466]
North West 0.0156[0.0477] 0.0087[0.044] -0.0511[0.0782]
Center West 0.0541[0.0275]** -0.0859[0.0273]*** -0.1199[0.0496]**
Time trend 0.0229[0.0129]* -0.0023[0.0125] 0.0175[0.0183]
Constant 0.2582[0.1484] 0.2921[0.147] 0.3538[0.2144]
Standard errors in [] Significance level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.12: IV estimation (small cohorts) for sexual behavior men and women
combined
No sex No condom[U] No condom[C]
Education
Dropping after PS 0.0538[0.3529] 0.4225[0.3447] 0.6447[0.369]*
Demographics
Female 0.1506[0.0267]*** 0.0207[0.0257] 0.195[0.0424]***
Indigenous 0.1455[0.0892] -0.1357[0.0857] -0.2864[0.2751]
S. economic index
Middle 0.0747[0.058] -0.0328[0.0577] 0.0729[0.1037]
High 0.0831[0.0804] -0.0893[0.0771] 0.0088[0.1443]
Family background
F. Problems -0.0594[0.0268]** 0.0562[0.0269]** 0.0341[0.0424]
Social cluster
Religious 0.0715[0.0275]*** -0.046[0.0265]* 0.0093[0.044]
Rock music 0.0016[0.0398] 0.0031[0.0376] 0.0525[0.0664]
Residence
Urban -0.0417[0.0333] 0.0215[0.0326] -0.0036[0.0593]
Big City -0.0017[0.0355] -0.0028[0.033] -0.0028[0.0541]
Center -0.034[0.0495] 0.017[0.0495] 0.0053[0.0832]
North East 0.0319[0.0422] 0.0097[0.0421] 0.0472[0.0715]
North West 0.0521[0.0698] -0.0042[0.0664] 0[0.117]
Center West 0.0678[0.0385]* -0.1016[0.0395]** -0.066[0.075]
Constant 0.3142[0.1034]*** 0.319[0.1031]*** 0.3329[0.2076]
Standard errors in [] Significance level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.13: Probability of start smoking between 14 and 19 years old, OLS estima-
tion
Men and women Women only
Education
Dropping after PS -0.0606[0.0206]*** -0.0705[0.0203]***
Demographics
Female -0.2219[0.0167]***
Indigenous -0.0412[0.0361] -0.0791[0.0334]**
S. economic index
Middle 0.0213[0.0182] 0.0091[0.0203]
High 0.0432[0.0294] 0.0189[0.0358]
Family background
F. Problems 0.0644[0.0165]*** 0.0585[0.0191]***
Social cluster
Religious -0.0431[0.0155]*** -0.044[0.0173]**
Rock music 0.0422[0.0209]** 0.0562[0.0272]**
Residence
Urban 0.0822[0.0175]*** 0.0852[0.0185]***
Big City 0.0714[0.0215]*** 0.1064[0.0258]***
Center 0.1212[0.0289]*** 0.0863[0.0341]**
North East -0.0024[0.0236] -0.0237[0.0263]
North West -0.0342[0.039] -0.0207[0.0447]
Center West 0.0191[0.0217] -0.0142[0.0237]
Constant 0.3105[0.0277]*** 0.1092[0.0261]***
Standard errors in [] Significance level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.14: Probability of start smoking between 14 and 19 years old, IV estimation
Men and women Only women
Education
Dropping after PS -0.1051[0.213] -0.3876[0.1948]**
Demographics
Female -0.2201[0.0189]***
Indigenous -0.0357[0.044] -0.0454[0.0443]
S. economic index
Middle 0.0147[0.0363] -0.042[0.0379]
High 0.0349[0.0486] -0.0477[0.0537]
Family background
F. Problems 0.0656[0.0174]*** 0.0689[0.0206]***
Social cluster
Religious -0.0433[0.0155]*** -0.0401[0.018]**
Rock music 0.0397[0.0238]* 0.0345[0.0301]
Residence
Urban 0.0807[0.019]*** 0.0706[0.0215]***
Big City 0.0695[0.0232]*** 0.0946[0.0273]***
Center 0.1207[0.0289]*** 0.0713[0.0363]*
North East -0.0024[0.0236] -0.0362[0.0281]
North West -0.035[0.0389] -0.0428[0.0478]
Center West 0.0198[0.0218] -0.019[0.0248]
Constant 0.3209[0.0567]*** 0.2092[0.0675]***
Standard errors in [] Significance level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Bibliography
[1] Scott J. Adams. Educational attainment and health: Evidence from a sample
of older adults. Education Economics, 10(1):97–109, April 2002.
[2] Valerie Albouy and Laurent Lequien. Does compulsory education lower mor-
tality? Journal of Health Economics, 28(1):155–168, January 2009.
[3] Jacob Nielsen Arendt. Does education cause better health? a panel data anal-
ysis using school reforms for identification. Economics of Education Review,
24(2):149–160, April 2005.
[4] Kenneth J. Arrow. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. The
American Economic Review, 53(5):pp. 941–973, 1963.
[5] Sarah Baird, Ephraim Chirwa, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Ozler. The short-
term impacts of a schooling conditional cash transfer program on the sexual
behavior of young women. Policy Research Working Paper Series 5089, The
World Bank, October 2009.
[6] Rodrigo Barros. Wealthier but not much healthier: Effects of a health insurance
program for the poor in Mexico. Discussion Papers 09-002, Stanford Instititute
for Economic Policy Research, 2008.
[7] Mark C. Berger and J. Paul Leigh. Schooling, self-selection, and health. Journal
of Human Resources, 24(3):433–455, 1989.
[8] Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate. Public provision of private goods and the
redistribution of income. The American Economic Review, 81(4):pp. 979–984,
1991.
[9] Soren Blomquist, Vidar Christiansen, and Luca Micheletto. Public provision
of private goods and nondistortionary marginal tax rates. American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy, 2(2):1–27, 2010.
89
90 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[10] S¨ı¿1
2
ren Blomquist and Vidar Christiansen. Price subsidies versus public pro-
vision. Working Paper Series 1997:12, Uppsala University, Department of Eco-
nomics, May 1997.
[11] Robin Boadway, Maurice Marchand, and Motohiro Sato. Subsidies versus pub-
lic provision of private goods as instruments for redistribution. Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 100(3):545–64, September 1998.
[12] Giorgio Brunello, Daniele Fabbri, and Margherita Fort. Years of schooling,
human capital and the body mass index of European females. SOEPpapers
262, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), 2010.
[13] A. Colin Cameron and Pravin K. Trivedi. The role of income and health risk
in the choice of health insurance: Evidence from Australia. Journal of Public
Economics, 45(1):1 – 28, 1991.
[14] Adrian Colin Cameron, Pravin Trivedi, Frank Milne, and John Piggott. A
microeconometric model of the demand for health care and health insurance in
australia. Review of Economic Studies, 55(1):85–106, 1988.
[15] Damon Clark and Heather Royer. The effect of education on adult health
and mortality: Evidence from britain. NBER Working Papers 16013, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, May 2010.
[16] Orla Doyle, Colm Harmon, and Ian Walker. The impact of parental income
and education on the health of their children. IZA Discussion Papers 1832,
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), November 2005.
[17] Carl Emmerson, Christine Frayne, and Alissa Goodman. Should private medical
insurance be subsidised? Healthcare U.K., 51(4):49–65, 2001.
[18] Sandra G., Sosa-Rubi, Omar Galarraga, and Jeffrey E. Harris. Heterogeneous
impact of the ”seguro popular” program on the utilization of obstetrical services
in Mexico, 2001-2006: A multinomial probit model with a discrete endogenous
variable. Journal of Health Economics, 28(1):20–34, 2009.
[19] Jacob Glazer and Thomas G. McGuire. Gold and silver health plans: Accom-
modating demand heterogeneity in managed competition. Journal of Health
Economics, In Press, Accepted Manuscript:–, 2011.
[20] C Gourieroux, J J Laffont, and A Monfort. Coherency conditions in simultane-
ous linear equation models with endogenous switching regimes. Econometrica,
48(3):675–95, April 1980.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 91
[21] Dominique Henriet and Jean-Charles Rochet. Is public health insurance an ap-
propriate instrument for redistribution? Annales d’Economie et de Statistique,
(83-84):03, July 2006.
[22] Michael Hoel and Erik Magnus Saether. Public health care with waiting time:
the role of supplementary private health care. Journal of Health Economics,
22(4):599 – 616, 2003.
[23] J. Huguening. Multivariate Normal Distribution and Simultaneous Equation
Probit Analysis. PhD thesis, University of Lausanne, 2004.
[24] Donald S Kenkel. Health behavior, health knowledge, and schooling. Journal
of Political Economy, 99(2):287–305, April 1991.
[25] FM Knaul and J Frenk. Health insurance in Mexico: achieving universal cov-
erage through structural reform. Health Affairs, 24:1467–76, 2005.
[26] Adriana Lleras-Muney. The relationship between education and adult mortality
in the united states. Review of Economic Studies, 72(1):189–221, 01 2005.
[27] Angel Lopez Nicolas and Marcos Vera-Hernandez. Are tax subsidies for pri-
vate medical insurance self-financing? evidence from a microsimulation model.
Journal of Health Economics, 27(5):1285–1298, 2008.
[28] G. S. Maddala. Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics.
Econometric Society Monographs,, 1983.
[29] Joseph P. . Newhouse and Mass.: the Insurance Experiment Group, Cambridge.
Free for All? Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. Harvard
University Press, 1993.
[30] Don Nutbeam. Health literacy as a public health goal: a challenge for contem-
porary health education and communication strategies into the 21st century.
Health Promotion International, 15(3):259–267, 2000.
[31] Marisol Rodriguez and Alexandrina Stoyanova. Changes in the demand for
private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives. Health Economics,
17(2):185–202, 2008.
[32] Michael Rothschild and Joseph E Stiglitz. Equilibrium in competitive insurance
markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 90(4):630–49, November 1976.
[33] Claudio Sapelli and Bernardita Vial. Self-selection and moral hazard in chilean
health insurance. Journal of Health Economics, 22(3):459 – 476, 2003.
92 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[34] Antoine Terracol. Triprobit: Stata module to estimate trivariate probit model
using the ghk simulator. Statistical Software Components, Boston College De-
partment of Economics, February 2002.
[35] Hans van Kippersluis, Owen O’Donnell, and Eddy van Doorslaer. Long run
returns to education: Does schooling lead to an extended old age? Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Papers 09-037/3, Tinbergen Institute, 2009.
[36] M. Zorrilla. La educacio´n secundaria en Me´xico: Al f´ılo de su reforma. Revista
Electro´nica Iberoamericana sobre la calidad, Eficacia y Cambio en Educacio´n.,
2:1–22, 2004.
[37] Paola Zuniga. A random utility model for self-employment and health insur-
ance contributions choice: An estimation for the Mexican workers. PhD thesis,
University of Lausanne, 2008.
List of Figures
2.1 Valuation and cost for quality, and its first-best level, for healthy and
sick rich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Public sector quality and budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3 Public sector quality and subsidy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4 Public sector quality and subsidy under health solidarity policy . . . 38
2.5 Public sector quality and subsidy under separating contracts . . . . . 41
2.6 Example different size in budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.7 Example different proportion rich poor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.8 Example different proportion healthy sick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.9 Example different gap on the illness episodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.1 Effect of the 1993 Reform on the drop rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
93
94 LIST OF FIGURES
List of Tables
1.1 Explanatory variables means, conditional on health insurance status . 11
1.2 Instrumental variables means, conditional on endogenous variable value 13
1.3 Estimation for ambulatory use equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 Estimation for hospitalization equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Estimation for SPS enrollment equation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.6 Quality of adjustment and the Variance Covariance matrix . . . . . . 19
2.1 Example values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.1 Descriptive statistics for sexual behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.2 Descriptive statistics for tobbaco use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3 OLS Regression for dropping after primary school. . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.4 Probability of having not sex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.5 Probability of having sex without condom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.6 Conditional probability of having sex without condom . . . . . . . . . 81
3.7 OLS estimation for sexual behavior only women . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.8 IV estimation for sexual behavior only women . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.9 IV estimation for sexual behavior men and women combined). . . . . 83
3.10 Bivariate probit estimation for sexual behavior men and women com-
bined). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.11 IV estimation with cohort trend for sexual behavior men and women
combined). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.12 IV estimation (small cohorts) for sexual behavior men and women
combined). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
95
96 LIST OF TABLES
3.13 Probability of start smoking between 14 and 19 years old, OLS esti-
mation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.14 Probability of start smoking between 14 and 19 years old, IV estima-
tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
